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INTRODUCTION
Personal tastes, preferences, impulses, and expressions appear
to be candidates for a new constitutional protection. No recent
constitutional trend, in fact, seems more significant. One is hard
pressed to account fully for this development, much less for the
recurrence of personal lifestyle issues in what is supposedly a more
conservative and more traditionalist Supreme Court. Perhaps the
new trend portends a fundamental shift in values: the emergence
of a national ethic that, in matters of style and morality, personal
choice is paramount. Perhaps the momentum of racial and sexual
egalitarianism has brought with it a demand for acceptance of a
panoply of personal lifestyles. Or perhaps it is simply that as we
perceive ourselves less capable of influencing our national and
communal fates, we demand greater freedom to direct our lives as
individuals.
Although its causes are complex, the phenomenon itself is
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* We are indebted to our colleagues, Richard Bonnie and Walter Wadlington, for shar-
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clear. The Supreme Court is increasingly being invited to extend
constitutional protection to personal lifestyle choices.' By "lifestyle
choice" we mean an individual's decision to exercise control over
the most personal aspects of his or her life. The term lifestyle is
used in its original sense, stripped of popular connotations: it re-
fers to the capacity to craft one's initimate, personal existence in
the manner that one sees fit.
Such is the pace of constitutional litigation in this area that
Griswold v. Connecticut2 already seems something of a grandfather
case. Part of Griswold's mystique is its utter imprecision: Justice
Douglas' opinion has generated more emanations than those on
which it purported to draw.3 It is no accident that Justice Douglas
was the most ardent and explicit champion of lifestyle freedom yet
to sit on the Court.4 He left much in the way of stirring words and
phrases, precious little in the way of analytic definition. The void
seems unfortunate, because no constitutional issue has been more
prone to loose platitude and sweeping assertion than the relation-
ship of law to personal lifestyle choice.
Our discussion of lifestyle freedom attempts to refine some
existing constitutional categories and to present a unified frame-
work for analysis of lifestyle issues reaching the Court today. We
do not focus exclusively on a right of privacy, although privacy
may at times be a propitious and even a necessary condition for
personal lifestyle choices to operate. But many of the personal
choices deemed eligible for protection-personal appearance, for
example-are at least in part visible to the public and do not in-
volve governmental intrusion or surveillance. Nor are we dis-
cussing only a right of autonomy, if that term is confined to per-
sonal activities that involve no demonstrable harm to others. 5 Exer-
cise of lifestyle freedom may adversely affect others, whether they
be the children of a broken marriage or even, in the Supreme
1 The invitation is not always accepted. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976);
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S.
901 (1976).
2 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3 See the extensive Comments on the Griswold case by Professors Dixon, Emerson,
Kauper, McKay, and Sutherland in 64 MIcH. L. REv. 197-288 (1965).
4 See, e.g., Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973) (concurring
opinion, Douglas, J.); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 209 (1973) (concurring opinion, Doug-
las, J.); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 529 (1973) (concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part, Douglas, J.); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). But see Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
5 See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 654-55 (9th ed.
1975); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLUm. L. REv. 1410 (1974).
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Court's words, those having merely "the potentiality of human
life. "6
Our treatment of the lifestyle cases concentrates initially upon
three basic categories, which can be represented in terms of "free-
doms." The first is a freedom of personal companionship, where
the individual claims the right to select his most intimate domestic
associates. The second is a freedom of personal sexual conduct.
And the third is a freedom of personal dress and appearance.
The scope of each of these freedoms will be analyzed in detail
in succeeding sections. Our analysis implicitly asks three related
questions: First, what kinds of lifestyle issues is the Court currently
confronting? Second, what lifestyle freedoms is it protecting and
what competing state interests is it taking into account? Third,
what standards for judicial review currently dominate the personal
lifestyle area?
Finally, in a concluding section we consider lifestyle issues
from a more general perspective. We set forth justifications for
judicial intervention to protect lifestyle freedoms; we discuss the
scope of a general constitutional lifestyle right; and we survey and
assess the state interests in restricting lifestyle choices. We conclude
that within certain limits judicial protection of personal lifestyle
choices is constitutionally warranted and socially desirable, that the
Court reaffirms its historic function by protecting lifestyle choices,
but that indiscriminate and unreasoned vindication of lifestyle
freedoms is no more desirable than insensitivity to them.
I
DOMESTIC COMPANIONSHIP
The peculiar intimacy of the home environment and the rela-
tionships within it have in the past decade caused the Court to
guarantee a significant measure of personal control over domestic
companionship. This section will demonstrate that the right of
domestic association is broader than is commonly supposed, that it
is, within certain limits, a legitimate candidate for constitutional
protection, but that unless the Court gives serious thought to those
limits, the right may soon take on "strange boundaries as yet
undiscernible."7
The Court's struggle with the new right of domestic compan-
6 Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
7 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 668 (1972) (dissenting opinion, Burger, C.J.).
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ionship has been inextricably related to recent pervasive changes in
American family life. Those changes have been the subject of such
intense discussion elsewhere' that a brief summary suffices here.
The trend has been from uniformity to diversity and individuality
in domestic lifestyles. Larger numbers of Americans are rejecting
the idea that marriage is a lifelong union and that the formal
family is the exclusive unit for bearing and raising children. 9 Mar-
riage itself is changing as men and women alter such traditional
roles as providers and housewives. Divorce is becoming more
commonplace and less stigmatized.' Children are more likely to be
born out of wedlock and raised by a single parent.'" Indeed, more
Americans are finding it advantageous to bypass formal marriage
altogether and cohabit in what one writer terms the "shadow in-
stitution [of] informal de facto marriage.' 12
The primary legal battleground for such changes is, of course,
state domestic relations law and not constitutional law. The state,
through its police power, has traditionally regulated popular mor-
ality, and the Supreme Court still formally acknowledges that
domestic relations "ha[ve] long been regarded as a virtually exclu-
sive province of the States."' 3 State law has not invariably been
resistant to changes in domestic lifestyles. Divorce laws have be-
come more lenient and now include no-fault grounds alongside
'E.g., L. CASLER, IS MARRIAGE NECESSARY? (1974); N. O'NEILL & G. O'NEILL, OPEN
MARRIAGE (1972); A. SKOLNICK & J. SKOLNICK, FAMILY IN TRANSITION (1971); B. YORBURG,
THE CHANGING FAMILY (1973); Glick, A Demographer Looks at American Families, 37 J. MARR.
& FAN. 15 (1975); Novak, The Family Out of Favor, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Apr. 1976, at 37.
9 See R. LIBBY & R. WHITEHURST, RENOVATING MARRIAGE: TOWARD NEW SEXUAL LIFE-
STYLES (1973); C. ROGERS, BECOMING PARTNERS: MARRIAGE AND ITS ALTERNATIVES (1972);
Ramey, Intimate Networks: Will They Replace the Monogamous Family?, 9 FUTURIST 175 (1975).
"' See H. CARTER & P. GLICK, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDY
(1970); J. EPSTEIN, DIVORCED IN AMERICA (1974); Bernard, Note on Changing Life Styles,
1970-1974, 37 J. MARR. & FAM. 582, 583-84 (1974); More and More Broken Marriages, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 14, 1972, at 30.
i As one reporter describes this trend:
Despite the array of alternatives for today's woman-contraception, abortion,
adoption-the number of unmarried women giving birth and then raising their
children has risen dramatically. Though still just under 1 percent of all families,
their numbers have increased five-fold in the past fifteen years, with the fastest
rise taking place since 1970 .... Associated primarily with poor people, or occa-
sionally with the Bohemian chic of the upper classes, the phenomenon of the
unmarried mother, though still rare, is becoming more visible among women with
middle class backgrounds. Sawyer, For Unmarried Mothers, There are Feelings of Ful-
fillment Mixed With Resentment, Washington Post, Apr. 15, 1976, § D.C. (district
weekly), at 1, col. 3.
12 Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REV. 663,
665 (1976).
1" Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975).
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or in lieu of fault grounds. 14 New alimony and support statutes
require state courts to rely less on gender and more on the circum-
stances of a particular marriage.15 Criminal laws prohibiting ex-
tramarital sexual behavior have been either relaxed or indiffer-
ently enforced.' 6 State barriers to marriage, always minimal, have
become even less stringent.'" Indeed, state law will inevitably be
encouraged to keep pace with shifting lifestyle trends, or else risk
evasion or irrelevance. If, for example, the barriers to marriage
become too strict, couples may be encouraged to ignore them and
cohabit. If divorce becomes too difficult, spouses might be inclined
to remarry surreptitiously before an existing marriage has been
formally dissolved, or simply to terminate their marriage infor-
mally. If prospects of alimony or child support appear unfair or
burdensome, spouses might be tempted to flee the jurisdiction and
so escape the obligations of formal marriage separation.
Thus state law, however sluggishly and reluctantly, is forced to
accommodate domestic lifestyle changes. But the question of how
constitutional law ought to respond to this evolving domestic life-
style pattern is more subtle and difficult. Constitutional law, unlike
state law, has the unique potential to bestow a national benediction
upon unconventional domestic lifestyles. The Supreme Court,
more than any other instrument of American government, is in-
stitutionally receptive to pleas for national tolerance of those whose
domestic arrangements have heretofore received little popular
support. As we shall see, the effect of constitutional law in the
domestic lifestyle area is potentially fourfold: to guarantee greater
freedom of entry into and exit from formal family relationships, to
encourage and validate role changes within the family or marriage
partnership,1 8 to make available formal family status to unor-
14See Foster & Freed, Divorce Reform: Breaks on Breakdown?, 13 J. FAMt. L. 443
(1973-74). As of June 1, 1974, only five states-Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Penn-
sylvania, and South Dakota-retained marital misconduct as the sole ground for divorce.
Freed, Grounds for Divorce in the American Jurisdictions, 8 FAm. L.Q. 401, 401 (1974).
" See, e.g., the 1975 amendment to VA. CODE § 20-61 (1975), requiring reciprocal
support between the spouses during marriage, and the 1975 amendment to VA. CODE §
20-107 (1975), insuring that alimony could be awarded to either spouse upon dissolution
of marriage.
1 See, e.g., Project, The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical Study of
Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 643, 688-89 (1966).
17 See, e.g., R. BARROW & H. FABING, EPILEPSY AND THE LAW 30 (2d ed. 1966) (noting
removal of marriage prohibitions on epileptics); M. PAULSEN, W. WADLINGTON & J. GOE-
BEL, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 131 (2d ed. 1974) (noting simi-
lar removal in favor of persons with tuberculosis).
18 This has been the effect of the Court's recent attack on sex discrimination, discussed
in Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975 SuP. CT. REV. 1.
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thodox groups, and to confer legitimacy and recognition upon ex-
trafamilial relationships. 19
In each of these instances, the force of constitutional law con-
fronts the traditional order. The Court must often decide whether
to use the Constitution to deprive the familya-long regarded as the
cornerstone of American society-of its favored status under law.
It is; true ithat the law has always been limited in its capacity to
maintain conventional family arrangements; witness the wide-
spi:ead use of perjury and collusion to evade statutes limiting di-
'orce to fault grounds alone." Yet in areas involving traditional
;morality, society values law as much for its instructional as for its
,coercive effect. Law is a vehicle by which democratic majorities
reaffirm shared moral aspirations and summon society's allegiance
to a common set of behavioral goals. Deploying the Constitution to
undermine conventional precepts of domestic morality is a step not
lightly taken.
It is, however, a step the Court will sometimes take. There will
always be some Americans who resist traditional conceptions of
family life and regard the favored legal status of the nuclear family
as economically oppressive and a source of indignity and affront.
Most obvious are those Americans who live outside the traditional
family unit for reasons at least partly beyond their control. Such a
category would include illegitimate children, homosexuals whose
preferences preclude marriage, fundamentalist Mormons for
whom polygamy is religiously mandated, and members of minority
groups for whom economic, social, and cultural pressures cause
disproportionate rates of family breakdown. To date the Court has
dealt erratically with these "outsiders," vindicating on occasion the
rights of illegitimates, 21 while upholding enactments against homo-
sexuals22 and polygamists. 23
"E.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
2" See Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32, 33 (1966).
2 1 E.g., New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (invalidating
statute denying welfare benefits to households with illegitimate children); Gomez v. Perez,
409 U.S. 535 (1973) (invalidating statute denying right of parental support to illegitimate
children); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (invalidating statute deny-
ing right of illegitimate child to recover workmen's compensation benefits); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (invalidating statute denying right of illegitimate child to
recover for wrongful death). But cf. Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976) (upholding
statute requiring that, in order to qualify for Social Security benefits, illegitimate child
must prove that deceased wage earner was parent and was living with or contributing to
child's support at time of death); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (upholding in-
testate succession statute excluding illegitimate child in favor of collateral heirs).
22 Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 119, aff'd mem. 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
2" Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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Other Americans deliberately choose to live outside the tradi-
tional family unit, preferring for a variety of reasons to live to-
gether without the legal ties of marriage. With regard to such
persons the Court faces a formidable dilemma. The family is in-
dubitably a cornerstone of American society and should be favored
by the law; yet choice of domestic companionship constitutes the
kind of intimate personal decision that also deserves constitutional
respect. With such tensions in mind, three sets of lifestyle choices
are discussed herein: marriage and divorce, procreation, and ex-
trafamilial association.
A. The Choices of Marriage and Divorce
The first modern case to significantly protect domestic com-
panionship was Loving v. Virginia,24 where the Court held uncon-
stitutional a Virginia statute prohibiting interracial marriage. It is
true, of course, that marriage and the sharing of a household need
not always coincide. Persons may marry without living together,
and they may live together without marrying, but the general
meaning of marriage remains that of a shared life within a com-
mon abode. Had its result rested solely upon equal protection
grounds, Loving would have been a case addressed more to the
evils of racial discrimination than to the blessings of marriage. But
the Court held that the Virginia statute violated the due process
clause as well, explaining that "[tihe freedom to marry has long
been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. ' 25
The due process rationale of Loving calls into question other
state restrictions on the right of consenting persons to marry. It
appears, on reflection, that the Court could extend Loving beyond
the confines of race without granting an unrestricted marriage
right, but that such a course would not be without its complexities
and difficulties.
Minimum age requirements are, for example, one restriction
upon marriage that ought to survive post-Loving scrutiny, provided
that the minimum age is the same for male and female26 and,
arguably, that disabilities on youthful marriage are removed by the
age of eighteen.27 Minimum age restrictions are constitutionally
24 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
25 /d. at 12.
26 Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), appears to require as much.
27 Although the twenty-sixth amendment of the Constitution secures the vote for 18-
year olds in state and federal elections, it is doubtful that the Court would decree a sub-
stantive due process right to marry at the same age.
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justified because the age disability is temporary, because it applies
equally to all members of society, and because it is obvious that
with respect to age some arbitrary line must be drawn. The Court,
in fact, has consistently noted that the fundamental right to vote
can be denied to those under a state-prescribed minimum age. 28
Finally, in light of the frequent failure of early marriages, age
restrictions serve as a logical means of controlling the ill effects of
youthful marriage on the parties, their offspring, and the public
generally.2 9
More troublesome are prohibitions based upon consanguinity
and affinity which permanently prevent, as did the Loving pro-
hibition, desirous parties from marrying. Civil laws against consan-
guineous marriages, often paralleled by criminal prohibitions of
incest, are said to prevent the genetic deformities of inbreeding
and to promote family harmony by preventing intrafamily sexual
jealousy and rivalry. 3' Both of these ends are clearly legitimate,
and the maintenance of family tranquility alone should permit the
state to prevent parent-child and brother-sister unions, even if no
genetic evidence supports such a bar. It is questionable, however,
whether either of the above interests are served by prohibiting, for
example, marriages between first cousins. The enamorment of first
cousins seems not nearly so traumatic to the family structure as are
sexual attractions within the nuclear unit itself. Loving would sug-
gest that the state at least ought to bear the burden of establishing
a greater than normal likelihood of birth defects arising from mar-
riages of first cousins before being allowed to prohibit such
unions. 31
The Court has not had frequent occasion to test other possible
parameters of Loving. One recent case, 32 which the Court declined
to hear, involved the request of an inmate in the Utah prison
"
5 E.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969).
29 See Monahan, Does Age at Marraige Matter in Divorce?, 32 Soc. FORCES 81 (1953);
Schoen, California Divorce Rates by Age at First Marriage and Duration of First Marriage, 37 J.
MARR. & FAM. 548 (1975); Weed, Age at Marriage as a Factor in State Divorce Rate Differ-
entials, II DEMOGRAPHY 361 (1974).
" See 1. HERSKOWITZ, GENETICS 207-08 (2d ed. 1965).
3' See Moore, A Defense of First-Cousin Marriage, 10 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 136 (1961).
Prohibition on marriage by affinity, or among in-laws not related by blood, differs from
consanguineous marriages only in that the state interest in preventing deficient offspring is
not present. As with consanguineous marriages, however, Loving ought to require that any
prohibition be shown by the state to have more than a speculative bearing on the goal of
easing intrafamilial tension.
321n re Goalen, 30 Utah 2d 27, 512 P.2d 1028 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1148
(1974).
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system and one Ann Goalen to marry. The Utah Supreme Court,
in an intemperate opinion, held that "the refusal of the warden to
permit the marriage .. .does not violate petitioner's [Goalen's]
constitutional rights or those of her convicted friend. ' 33 Justice
Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, dissented briefly
from the denial of certiorari, noting that "[t]he extent to which this
right [of marriage] may be diluted for one in prison is something
the Court has never decided. 3 4
Reversal of the Utah Supreme Court in this instance would not
have involved an undue extension of the Loving rationale. The
claim that marriage would create disciplinary problems in prison
ignores the fact that inmates married at the time of incarceration
often remain so while in prison. Contact between the inmate and
his wife could still be carefully regulated. Indeed, the state's only
justification for its denial rested on the premise that an inmate
denied the right to marry might behave better in prison so as to
obtain early release; thus, the state claimed that the denial "act[ed]
as an incentive for the convict to aid in his own rehabilitation.
35
Yet there are sufficient rehabilitative incentives in the form of
good-time credits, prison privileges, and the possibility of joining
one's spouse full time upon release that would serve the same end
without denying the inmate a basic civil right.
A first look thus suggests that the inmate's claim should have
been upheld. On a second level, however, the claim raised a volatile
issue at the outer perimeters of Loving-the very nature of the
marriage contract itself. The inmate was capable of deriving
psychological pleasure and comfort from the thought of being
married; he could, in addition, meet many legal obligations of
marriage despite his incarceration.3 6 He was incapable, however, of
experiencing many conventional aspects of marriage: a shared
home, regular and unsupervised sexual access to his partner, and
the paternal care of offspring. In this light, the question is whether
the state can deny the right to marry to persons who cannot, at
least for a while, engage in many of its conventional incidents. With
respect to many such persons, the state makes no effort to deny the
right: soldiers going off to war and women beyond menopause
remain free to marry. The prospect of the soldier's prolonged
33/d. at 31,512 P.2d at 1030-31.
34 414 U.S. at 1150.
35 Id. at 1149.
36 It would make little difference in the administration of tax and inheritance statutes,
for example, whether a partner to marriage were an inmate or not.
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separation from the common abode or of the woman's childless-
ness are not thought sufficient to deny such persons the other
gratifications of a married state.
The question raised by inmate marriage thus has wider impli-
cations. The Court may one day face the question of why a
homosexual couple, professing deep mutual affection and willing
to assume the requisite legal obligations, should be denied the
pleasure, the legitimacy, or even the tax benefits of being
married .3 The fact that homosexuals cannot fulfill our conven-
tional idealizations of marriage-and bear children-may not ap-
pear to the Court a permissible reason to proscribe such a union,
any more than a state could deny marriage to sterile heterosexuals
or to those who chose to remain childless. Likewise wanting is any
state interest in banning promiscuous sexual habits, since marriage
is presumed to stablize rather than to diversify sexual activity.
More persuasive, however, would be the state's assertion that
granting homosexual affection the regard long accorded het-
erosexual matrimony would undermine the stability of traditional
family life. It is fair to argue that the stability of the nuclear family
in America has been fortified by a conception of marriage as an
exclusively heterosexual union. There is, moreover, a difference
between decriminalizing private, consensual conduct between
homosexuals and affirmatively blessing such relationships through
marriage. The former step signifies a removal of hostility and an
expression of social tolerance that stops short of approval. The
latter requires the state to give elevated and hallowed status to an
alternative sexual lifestyle fundamentally at odds with the moral
precepts of most Americans. Thus, even if private homosexual
conduct were decriminalized as a matter of constitutional right, a
freedom to marry would not follow.
The outer limits of Loving press still further. One can argue,
simplistically, that Loving ought to guarantee all consenting adults
the right to be bound in civil marriage, whether the combination be
one male and two females (polygyny), two males and one female
(polyandry), or, for that matter, three males and two females, as
long as each additional partner joins a consensual union. Bigamous
unions have faced a long history of prohibition, with which the
Supreme Court has been closely involved. The Court in Reynolds v.
United States38 upheld a federal criminal statute prohibiting biga-
17 See Comment, Constitutional Aspects of the Homosexual's Right to a Marriage License, 12 J.
FAI. L. 607 (1973); Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973).
38 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See also Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); Davis v.
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mous marriages, even against Mormon claims that such marriages
were religiously mandated. What was denied then against asser-
tions of free religious exercise is not likely to be sanctioned, close
to a century later, as a lifestyle right. Indeed, despite the plea of
one recent Justice for reversal of Reynolds,39 the Court has flatly
stated that "[s]tatutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an
individual's freedom to associate, but few today seriously claim
such statutes violate the First Amendment .... 4
The case against constitutional protection of bigamy is rather
more complicated than the Court suggested. The state interests
opposing recognition of bigamous marriages are several. Public
administration of tax laws, welfare benefits, estate distribution, and
alimony and support payments would become more complex if
bigamous marriages were recognized, although such "administra-
tive inconvenience," as the Court is wont to term it, is not normally
given great deference when a constitutional right is involved. 41 Thd
claim that bigamous marriages threaten our traditional monoga-
mous family arrangements might be met with some skepticism,
given the strength of the monogamous tradition, the practical dif-
ficulty of supporting two or more families simultaneously, and
the fact that divorce and successive remarriages are becoming
more readily available to one who falls in love with someone other
than his or her present spouse. Finally, one may question whether
children of bigamous marriages would suffer greater deprivation
than those presently living in single-parent homes. And if Stanley v.
Illinois42 prohibits a conclusive presumption that a single parent is
unfit to raise children, can a ban of bigamous marriages be jus-
tified on the conclusive presumption that all bigamous parents are
unfit?
The disinclination of the Court to extend Loving-type protec-
tion beyond the heterosexual and monogamous context suggests
that the Court fears extension of constitutional protection to
bizarre lifestyle choices would threaten traditional American con-
ceptions of family life. So great, in fact, is our emotional invest-
ment in orthodox family life that the rationality of these fears and
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Cannon v. United States, 116 U.S. 55 (1885); Murphy v.
Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
39 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 247 (1972) (dissenting in part, Douglas, J.).
41 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n. 15 (1973).
41See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 646 (1974); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). But cf.
Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976) (upheld validity of administrative convenience as
state concern in cases of less than strict scrutiny). See note 21 supra.
42 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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the reality of the threat may never be fully tested. The final irony
of Loving is thus laid bare. Too tightly constricted, that decision
becomes the repository for our most provincial mores; too freely
expanded, it might make traditional marriage a meaningless con-
cept. Unlike universal voting, for example, a universal right for
consenting persons of whatever sex and in whatever number to
marry could well undermine the very sanctity that led the Court to
regard the right to marry as fundamental in the first place.
Loving protected the right to join together in marriage. The
constitutional right to be rid of an unwanted spouse was first ad-
dressed in Boddie v. Connecticut.43 There the Court held that
Connecticut's sixty dollar filing fee in divorce actions was, as ap-
plied to indigents, a violation of due process.
It is not readily apparent which current of fourteenth
amendment analysis Boddie best represents. Justice Harlan's opin-
ion for the Court spoke in terms of procedural due process, claim-
ing that "the State's refusal to admit these appellants to its courts,
the sole means in Connecticut for obtaining a divorce, must be
regarded as the equivalent of denying them an opportunity to
be heard upon their claimed right to a dissolution of their mar-
riages .... "44 Yet the fit with pre-Boddie procedural due process
decisions was less than perfect. Those decisions had, as Justice
Harlan recognized, "typically involved rights of defendants-not,
as here, persons seeking access to the judicial process in the first
instance. ' 41
The Boddie Court also sidestepped an equal protection ra-
tionale for the decision that would have required either extending
the fundamental right of court access to civil actions, 46 or labeling
de facto discriminations against indigents suspect.47 Instead, Justice
Harlan laid the foundation for a substantive due process right to
divorce, against which he found the state interests of recouping
court costs and of discouraging frivolous actions insufficiently
compelling, and the means of promoting those interests through a
fee requirement too drastic. 48 Such heightened scrutiny of the
burdens placed upon the right to divorce comports with Harlan's
43 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
4 4 Id. at 380.
45 Id.. at 375.
46 The right was first thought to have been established for criminal actions in Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
17 Every public fee, whether a sales tax, municipal water rate, or tuition charge at a
public university, operates as a de facto discrimination on those least able to pay. See
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361-62 (1963) (dissenting opinion, Harlan, J.).
48 401 U.S. at 381-82.
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willingness elsewhere to discern substantive content in due
process.4 9 The rhetoric of Boddie suggests that the right to divorce
has become a necessary, if less than glorious, feature of our "living
tradition" of due process; divorce is identified as "the adjustment
of a fundamental human relationship" 5° and the method by which
"two consenting adults may... mutually liberate themselves from
the constraints of legal obligations that go with marriage, and more
fundamentally the prohibition against remarriage. . .. -51 A subse-
quent case, which upheld filing fee requirements, distinguished
Boddie as turning "on the marital relationship and on the associa-
tional interests that surround the establishment and dissolution of
that relationship." "On many occasions," the Court noted, "we have
recognized the fundamental importance of these interests under
our Constitution. 52
The emergence of divorce as a lifestyle right was sidetracked
by Sosna v. Iowa,53 where the Court upheld Iowa's requirement that
a person reside one year in the state before bringing an action for
divorce against a nonresident. Harmonizing Sosna and Boddie is
difficult. The Sosna majority disregarded the heightened standard
of scrutiny applied by the Boddie Court to a law burdening the
right to divorce and reverted to a rational basis test. The Court
deferred to Iowa's interests in not becoming a "divorce mill" and in
protecting its divorce decrees against collateral attack, 54 even
though less drastic means of promoting those interests were
available.5 5 More important was the Sosna Court's purported dis-
tinction of Boddie. The Connecticut statute, noted the Court,
worked a "total deprivation" of divorce opportunities; the Iowa law
resulted only in a delay.5 6
One clear implication of the delay-deprivation distinction is
that state laws requiring lengthy periods of separation before cou-
ples become eligible for divorce are clearly constitutional. Before
Sosna, such laws might have been attacked as impermissible bur-
4 9 E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500-02 (1965) (concurring opinion). For
intriguing speculation on how Justice Harlan might have voted in the abortion decisions,
see Redlich, A Black-Harlan Dialogue on Due Process and Equal Protection: Overheard in Heaven
and Dedicated to Robert B. McKay, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 20, 33-34 (1975).
5,,401 U.S. at 383.
5, Id. at 376.
52 United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444 (1973). Accord, Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S.
656 (1973).
53 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
51 Id. at 407.
5: A less drastic alternative would have required that the party seeking divorce prove
himself to be a domiciliary of Iowa. See id. at 424-27 (dissenting opinion, Marshall, J.).
-6 d. at 410. The distinction was criticized in justice Marshall's dissent. Id. at 422 n.2.
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dens upon the right of divorce. What public interest, one might
argue, is threatened by the essentially private matter of whether X
and Y remain married? A state interest in the welfare of the chil-
dren appears insufficient, since unhappy parents can separate
anyway, and a life of constant parental friction may harm the child
more than divorce. Another state interest in separation periods,
that marital relationships not be lightly broken off, can be ade-
quately protected by the obstacles of property settlement, alimony,
child support and custody decrees, the embarrassment of public
declaration of marital failure, and the emotional cost of terminat-
ing so intimate a relationship. At least, one might argue that a six-
month waiting period, as opposed to two years, for example, ade-
quately serves any state interest in providing a reasonable period
for a couple to reflect upon the prospects of reconciliation. 57
After Sosna, however, such arguments are fanciful. The right
of divorce now seems constitutionally inert and much less funda-
mental than the right of marriage. The present Court would pre-
sumably tolerate a two-year separation requirement prior to di-
vorce, while it is hard to imagine any court upholding a two-year
waiting or acquaintanceship period prior to marriage. The logical
consistency of granting a right freely to enter a relationship that
one has no right freely to dissolve is questionable. Confinement in
a destructive relationship is arguably as damaging as being pre-
vented from forming a desired union. The destructive impact of
the former may indeed be lessened by physical, if not legal, separa-
tion, but so may unmarried persons maintain physical, if not legal,
togetherness. In fact, state burdens upon divorce might be chal-
lenged under Loving itself as impermissible infringements upon the
right to marry, or to remarry, as the case may be.
Despite such arguments, the Court is well advised to accord
the right of marriage a more elevated status than that of divorce.
The Court's position comports with a persistent assumption in
American life that marriages are more easily made than broken.
The very conception of marriage as a contract implies that marital
unions, once made, may not be trivially or inconsequentially un-
done. The Court has some obligation to further this conception. If
marriage is to exist primarily for the self-gratification of the indi-
vidual partners, then perhaps it should be permitted to dissolve at
the first diminution of affection. If, on the other hand, the state
intends it to signify an enduring relationship of reciprocal duty
" A shortened time period in the context of durational residency requirements for
voters was required by the Court in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 348 (1972).
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and commitment, 58 as well as of mutual emotional involvement,
then a required pause before dissolution should not be unconstitu-
tional. Constitutional law must confront the paradox that making
divorce fundamental, and thus readily obtainable, might in the end
make marriage seem much less so.
All this is not to say that the right of divorce ought to be
stripped of all constitutional protection. The law should not force a
person to endure indefinitely a close relationship he or she has
come to despise. Divorce is a lifestyle choice of sufficient intimacy
to override laws that, at least in comparison with those of sister
states, make divorce unduly difficult to obtain.59 Such a compara-
tive standard may contradict the maxim that "a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country. '' 61 Yet the Court has often noted that states may not ex-
periment at will with important human rights. 6 1
B. The Choices of Procreation and Nonprocreation
The Supreme Court has afforded further constitutional pro-
tection to lifestyle choices customarily associated with, although not
limited to, the formation and character of the nuclear family. As
one has at least a limited right under Loving to marry whom one
pleases, so one enjoys constitutional protection in the fundamental
decision "whether to bear or beget a child. '6 2 The leading procrea-
tional case, Skinner v. Oklahoma,63 struck down as violative of the
equal protection clause an Oklahoma statute that inflicted compul-
sory sterilization on habitual larcenists but not on habitual em-
bezzlers. Procreational rights have also been protected short of
state-imposed incapacitation. In Cleveland Board of Education v. La-
Fleur,64 the Court found that mandatory maternity leaves for pub-
lic school teachers after the fourth and fifth months of pregnancy
" The duty seems stronger in the case of families with children, where the state has a
heightened interest in the prospects of marital reconciliation. Thus, more stringent divorce
laws for married parents than for childless couples might be constitutionally permissible.
11 For example, before being amended in 1966, 1962 N.Y. Laws, c. 313, § 170, permit-
ted divorce only on grounds of adultery. And presently, some states still adhere solely to
fault grounds for divorce. E.g., S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 25-4-2 (1967).
60 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (dissenting opinion, Bran-
deis, J.).
61 The fourteenth amendment incorporation of the federal Bill of Rights proceeds on
such an assumption.
62 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
63 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
64 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
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unduly burdened a teacher's decision to bear a child. LaFleur may
in fact vindicate more than the right to procreate, for it upholds
the right of a woman to combine a career with motherhood with-
out unnecessary state restriction of either element.
The right to procreate also suggests a right not to procreate.
The latter may have emerged sub silentio in Griswold, where the
right to use contraceptives seemed secondary to the Court's focus
on the "intimate relation of husband and wife. ' 65 Seven years later,
in Eisenstadt v. Baird,66 the Court announced that "whatever the
rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the
rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married
alike. '67 Only in Roe v. Wade,68 however, did the right not to pro-
create gain firm recognition as a lifestyle decision. In upholding
the right to abortion, the Court recognized that an unwanted child
might create a "distressful life and future," with psychological,
physical, and financial burdens for the woman concerned. 69 Al-
though Roe has been severely criticized, 711 the decision is not an il-
logical extension of the Court's earlier decisions in matters of in-
timate association. Indeed, if procreation is to be labeled a constitu-
tional right, it may imply a full freedom of negative choice, in the
same sense that marriage implies a full choice not to marry, voting
not to vote, and travel to remain at home. For the constitutional
right of procreation can hardly be fundamental if one is compelled
to exercise it.
The Court has extended the right of procreation rather freely.
Procreational choice has been protected for males as well as
females,7 1 and for unmarried as well as married persons. 2
Moreover, the right may extend beyond the acts of intercourse and
childbirth to the parent's right, as yet poorly defined, to make
certain lifestyle choices of a practical and spiritual nature for his
65 381 U.S. at 482.
66 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
67 Id. at 453.
68 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6 9 Id. at 153.
7
"
1 E.g., Ely, The Wages of Cri~ng Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT.
REV. 159. The latter concludes that Roe is "symptomatic of the analytical poverty possible
in constitutional litigation." Id. at 184. But cf. Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police
Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689 (1976) (Roe
represents ethical function of following cultural transformations in society).
71 Compare Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (males), with Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (females).
172 Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (married), with Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (unmarried).
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offspring.7 3 Yet clearly this lifestyle choice is not absolute, and
labeling procreation "fundamental" creates more difficulties than
it resolves. The Court itself has hinted that the right need not be
underwritten by the public fisc: it has upheld maximum family-
grant ceilings under the AFDC program,7 4 as well as a state's ex-
clusion of pregnancy and childbirth expenses from disability in-
surance coverage.75 And Congress undoubtedly could "constitu-
tionally seek to discourage excessive population growth by limit-
ing tax deductions for dependents. '"76
Other purposeful and common burdens are placed on procre-
ation, as there must logically be on any act with consequences so
formidable as the creation and introduction into society of a new
being. For example, there is yet no legal right to procreate with
impunity, for parents in every state may be made liable for child
support. Nor is there a right to have sexual relations, much less to
procreate, with any willing partner, for criminal and civil sanctions
still attach to incest and adultery. Thus procreational choices are,
despite their constitutionally protected status, limited by laws that
identify marriage with possessive and exclusive sexual relations and
that favor the family as the best environment for raising offspring.
The focus of the right to procreate is often less on the sexual
act itself than on the gratifications and burdens of raising children.
In a society where sexual and procreational choices seem ever
more distinct, this emphasis is appropriate. Thus, in Stanley v.
Illinois7 the Court spoke of "the interest of a parent in the com-
panionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
children,178 and of the "warm, enduring" bonds between parent
and child. 79 This emphasis on the rewards of child-rearing may in
time lead to recognition of a fundamental right of adoption or of
child custody, insofar as courts may insist that public agency pro-
cedures affecting placement of children be both open and fair.8 1 ,
For example, characteristics of prospective adoptive parents
73 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
74 Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970).
75 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
76 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 651 (1974) (concurring opinion,
Powell, J.).
77 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
7 1 Id. at 651.
79 Id. at 652.
8, For an overview of the procedures of adoptive agencies, see CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE
OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR ADOPTION SERVICE (rev. ed. 1973).
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such as age, physical resemblance to the child, length of residence
in the community, or length of marriage might not be allowed to
operate as conclusive presumptions of parental unfitness, 8' al-
though an adoptive agency might still be allowed to consider care-
fully such factors in making a placement. Although the doctrine of
conclusive presumption has been repeatedly criticized, 82 it has
gained its greatest acceptance in the area of child-bearing and cus-
tody rights.8 3 Certainly the use of rebuttable presumptions would
have the advantage of not replacing agency expertise with constitu-
tional command. Thus, the Court might not overturn the use of
certain factors as presumptions, but instead might require adoptive
agencies to give prospective parents a brief hearing on their appli-
cation, a statement of reasons for an adverse decision, and,
perhaps, a limited opportunity to review an initial rejection. Such a
course would not be without substantial costs,8 4 but the Court may
find it more awkward to differentiate the rights of natural parents,
whose custody right it has already protected, 85 from the rights of
persons seeking the gratifications of parenthood through
adoption.86
As with other lifestyle choices, the right to procreate has been
imperfectly analyzed by the Court; only a few of its many implica-
tions have been examined.8 7 Before the post-World War II baby
boom, Skinner declared that the right to procreate was "fundamen-
tal to the very existence and survival of the race. ''88 Certainly, this
81 Professor Clark has argued similarly with respect to religious belief: "Many, if not
most, adoptions affect children too young to have formed religious beliefs. With the con-
temporary trend toward earlier adoption, some children go direct from the hospital to
their adoptive parents. It makes little sense to talk of their religion." H. CLARK, LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 647 (1968).
" See Bezanson, Some Thoughts on the Emerging Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine, 7 IND.
L. REV. 644 (1974); Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1534 (1974); Note, Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?,
72 MICH. L. REV. 800 (1974).
8 3 E.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632 (1974).
84 For an analysis of the costs of procedural due process, see Wilkinson, Goss v. Lopez:
The Supreme Court As School Superintendent, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 25, 52-62.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
86 Parents seeking to adopt a child would, however, be requesting a hearing on an
application for child custody. The Court to date has only required hearings on a threatened
deprivation of a liberty or property interest.
87 The whole question of compulsory sterilization, for example, raises complex con-
stitutional problems. See Gray, Compulsory Sterilization in a Free Society: Choices and Dilemmas,
41 U. CINN. L. REV. 529 (1972); Murdock, Sterilization of the Retarded: A Problem or a Solu-
tion?, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 917 (1974); Note, Legal Analysis and Population Control: The Prob-
lem of Coercion, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1856 (1971).
88 316 U.S. at 541.
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rationale is not persuasive in an overpopulated world. Although all
lifestyle rights are linked to an unusual degree to the moral per-
ceptions of the times, the right to procreate seems peculiarly vul-
nerable to shifting social and political perceptions. The stature of
the right may diminish in a period more concerned with the
legitimate dangers of overpopulation, or with the related and vol-
atile question of public support for dependent children. How a
future Court might react to such state motivations for burdening
the right is unforeseeable.
C. Extrafamilial Lifestyle Choices
Each of the constitutional rights discussed above is associated
with the creation or dissolution of the nuclear family or, in the case
of procreation, with a lifestyle choice that is most often exercised
within the formal family unit. A crucial question, however, is
whether extrafamilial lifestyle choices of domestic companionship
and association likewise merit constitutional protection. The first
cases where the Court extended such protection to biological rela-
tionships outside the formal family involved discrimination against
illegitimate children. The Court forbade states from disadvantag-
ing illegitimates in the recovery of wrongful death 89 and work-
men's compensation benefits, 9" and in their right to support from
their natural fathers. 91 The primary state interest in burdening
illegitimacy-that of expressing disapproval of extrafamilial sexual
activity-was held insufficient to support such discrimination.
The illegitimacy cases make clear, however, that the Court was
more concerned with the penalties suffered by innocent offspring
than with the extramarital lifestyle choices of parents.92 The Court
did not intend to disparage support of the formal family unit as a
legitimate state end; it was concerned with the means-the stig-
matizing of innocent offspring-by which the end was furthered.93
Yet it is significant that the Court was willing to undertake even
this scrutiny of means, given that the state's interest in preserving
family stability was at stake.
'9 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
9o Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
91 Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973). The protection for illegitimates has not, of
course, been complete. See Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976); Labine v. Vincent, 401
U.S. 532 (1971).92 But cf. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (construction
of statute as barring wrongful death recovery by mother of illegitimate child held violative
of equal protection).
93 See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972).
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More dramatic than the illegitimacy cases is Stanley v. Illinois.94
There the petitioner was not the innocent victim of an extramarital
liaison, but rather was one who had shunned formal wedlock dur-
ing eighteen years of friendship with a woman by whom he had
fathered three children. Indeed, Chief Justice Burger in dissent
suggested that the petitioner's chief interest was "with the loss of
the welfare payments he would suffer as a result of the designation
of others as guardians of the children." ' In any event, the
petitioner challenged an Illinois procedure under which children
of an unwed father automatically became wards of the state upon
the death of the mother. In holding that the petitioner was entitled
to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were
taken from him, the Court rejected the dissent's argument that
Illinois was justified in recognizing only "those father-child rela-
tionships that arise in the context of family units bound together
by legal obligations arising from marriage or from adoption
proceedings.'96 The law should not refuse, the Court stated, "to
recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage
ceremony .... [Fjamilial bonds in such cases [are] often as warm,
enduring, and important as those arising within a more formally
organized family unit. 9
7
On its face Stanley stands for the proposition that a father's
personal interest in the raising and companionship of his children
is not defeated by his decision to remain unwed. Thus Stanley may
be seen to protect two lifestyle freedoms: a person may choose both
to remain unwed and to raise children, and the law may not force a
choice between the two. Read in such a manner, Stanley may sug-
gest, in an adoption setting, that an agency may not declare a man
or woman ineligible as an adoptive parent solely because he or she
is single. Read even more expansively, Stanley may suggest that the
raising of children in a commune may not be declared impermissi-
ble by the state solely on the ground that the three, four, or ten
adults most directly responsible for a child's upbringing are not
united by formal ties of marriage. It is true, of course, that pro-
spective adoptive parents and adults in a commune are not all, as
was Peter Stanley, the natural parents of the child. Yet it may be
questioned whether the lack of a blood relationship should over-
94 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
95 Id. at 667 (dissenting opinion, Burger, C.J.).
96 Id. at 663 (dissenting opinion, Burger, C.J.). See also New Jersey Welfare Rights Org.
v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (statute limiting benefits to "ceremonially" married parents
with children held violative of equal protection).
9, 405 U.S. at 651-52.
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ride Stanley's basic premise that the absence of a legal marriage may
not alone disqualify otherwise capable adults from child-raising
and custody.
Such thoughts seem to be journeys in fantasy. The context of
the Stanley decision suggests'that its implications for extrafamilial
lifestyle choices must be cautiously interpreted. To begin with, the
Court may have been persuaded to the petitioner's claim of paren-
tal fitness by his personal circumstances. He had "lived with the
two children whose custody [was] challenged all their lives, and...
[had] supported them." '98 In addition, the Court was seemingly
moved by the fact that Illinois forced unwed fathers to forfeit their
offspring, yet permitted "married fathers-whether divorced,
widowed, or separated-and mothers-even if unwed-the benefit
of the presumption that they [were] fit to raise their children."99
Finally, Stanley's victory was a partial one, for he won only the
right to a hearing on his parental fitness under ground rules as yet
unclear. A state may not, after Stanley, use unwed fatherhood as
conclusive evidence of unfitness, but, conceivably, it may still estab-
lish a rebuttable presumption that such a father is unfit. " ' And if
an unwed father is not as easily identified and located as was the
petitioner in Stanley, the state may yet be able to terminate the right
of parenthood without any hearing at all.101
In Stanley, a biological relationship buttressed the claim of
domestic companionship. The Court has also heard cases where
unrelated persons asserted a right to share a home. Such claims
confront the Court with a dilemma: should the right of domestic
companionship be extended to protect those whose living arrange-
ments are not "domestic" in the conventional sense of the word?
The home occupies a special place in constitutional law. It has
been protected against the groundless intrusion of the state; it is a
sanctuary where our most intimate feelings may flower. Sharing
home life with others has helped serve humanity's most elemental
needs: to fulfill sexual desires, to provide a place to raise a family,
and to ward off spiritual desolation through close companionship
with others. For some, sharing a home may mean a "doubling up
against the adversities of poverty"'' 1 2 or the taking in and minister-
ing to a stranger, or a simple coming together of "persons bound
8 Id. at 650 n.4.
99 Id. at 647.
"
0 See id. at 657 n.9; Bezanson, supra note 82, at 651-52.
11 See 405 U.S. at 657 n.9.
102 Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 542 (1973) (concurring opin-
ion, Douglas, J.).
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by profession, love, friendship, religious or political affiliation.11' 3
But while the home may serve as the locus of rewarding and en-
during human relationships, it may also be the site of the most
corrosive and destructive ones. In the latter instances the question,
as we have seen, is whether a household has a constitutional right
to dissolve as well as to form.
The earliest case involving the right of household association
for unrelated individuals was Department of Agriculture v. Moreno." 4
At issue in Moreno was a 1971 amendment to the Food Stamp Act
that excluded from the food stamp program any household whose
members were not all related. The Moreno claimants included a
fifty-six-year-old diabetic woman who lived with a female friend
and the latter's three children, and two women sharing living ex-
penses together in an apartment so that the daughter of one might
attend a nearby school for the deaf. Wishing to assist such people,
yet concerned to avoid creating a broad constitutional right to live
with whom one pleases, the Court merely declared the "unrelated
person" amendment to be "wholly without any rational basis."'" 5
The Court's evasion did not go unnoticed. Justice Rehnquist,
in dissent, found it rational for Congress to conclude that funding
only family units "provides a guarantee which is not provided by
households containing unrelated individuals that the household ex-
ists for some purpose other than to collect federal food stamps."'
'1 6
Given such a rational basis for the family unit preference, it is
difficult to resist the conclusion that Moreno represents the "unac-
knowledged application" of a more stringent standard of scrutiny. 1 7
The elevated scrutiny most likely was triggered by the Court's
awareness, as Justice Douglas put it, of an associational right of
"[p]eople who are desperately poor but unrelated [to] come to-
gether and join hands with the aim better to combat the crises of
poverty."'' "8 The Court's opinion itself may subtly support such a
lifestyle right, for it condemns the amendment as an exclusion of
"only those persons who are so desperately in need of aid that they
cannot even afford to alter their living arrangements so as to retain
their eligibility."' 1 9
103 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 16 (1974) (dissenting opinion, Mar-
shall, J.).
1" 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
5Id. at 538.
106 Id. at 546 (dissenting opinion, Rehnquist, J.).
" The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 133 (1973).
108 413 U.S. at 543 (concurring opinion, Douglas, J.).
119 Id. at 538.
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The issue of associational choice for unrelated persons was
more directly confronted one term after Moreno in Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas."n Unsuccessfully challenged in Belle Terre was a
village zoning ordinance restricting land use to one-family dwell-
ings and to household units containing not more than two unre-
lated persons. Justice Marshall, in a vigorous dissent, characterized
the ordinance as permitting "any number of persons related by
blood or marriage, be it two or twenty, to live in a single house-
hold, but [limiting] to two the number of unrelated persons ...
who can occupy a single home." '' The village, Marshall argued,
had "in effect ... acted to fence out those individuals whose choice
of lifestyle differs from that of its current residents."'"1 2 Neverthe-
less, in upholding the ordinance the Court appeared to condone,
at least tacitly, the preservation of social and class homogeneity as
a valid zoning goal:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor
vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project
addressed to family needs. ... It is ample to lay out zones where
family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion
and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people. 1"3
Moreno and Belle Terre are not easily reconciled. Both cases
concerned laws that burdened the right of domestic association of
unrelated persons. Although rational basis scrutiny was ostensibly
employed in both cases, the scrutiny in Belle Terre was of the tradi-
tional toothless kind, while that in Moreno was of the modern, more
interventionist variety." 4 In upholding the zoning ordinance in
Belle Terre, the Court observed that it was dealing with "economic
and social legislation," 5 where legislative judgment routinely
merits deference. Yet the statute overturned in Moreno was likewise
"economic and social" and involved the area of public appropria-
tions, where the Court has tolerated burdens even upon well-
established lifestyle rights." 6 So ambivalent an approach to the
416 U.S. 1 (1974).
Id. at 16 (dissenting opinion, Marshall, J.).
112 Id. at 16-17 (dissenting opinion, Marshall, J.).
113 Id. at 9.
I4 See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1972).
115 416 U.S. at 8.
U6 See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S.
535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See generally Wilkinson, The Sup-
reme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and The Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA.
L. REV. 945, 1005-17 (1975).
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associational rights of unrelated persons defies easy explanation.
Perhaps the Court in Belle Terre simply recoiled from a full inves-
tigation of exclusionary zoning practices, which fairly bristle not
only with burdens upon lifestyle rights but with difficult questions
of wealth discrimination. 1 ' Or perhaps the difference in the two
cases reflects nothing more than the fact that in Moreno the plain-
tiffs were representatives of the handicapped poor, while in Belle
Terre they were six college students.
The Court's performance in Moreno and Belle Terre is disap-
pointing not only in its inconsistency but in its failure even to
address the central issue pervading both cases: the extent to which
unrelated persons have a constitutional right to one another's per-
sonal, domestic companionship. A starting point for such an in-
quiry is Stanley v. Georgia,"8 which upheld the right of an adult to
possess and view obscene materials in the privacy of his home.
Courts may extend Stanley to the right to share the home with
whom one pleases, for the home furthers the pleasures of intimate
companionship as much as it permits the solitary viewing of ob-
scene materials." 9 Yet it is likewise clear that Stanley's protection of
the home as a haven is not unlimited, for the Court would not
uphold a constitutional right to murder in the home, to emit rau-
cous noise, or to possess narcotics, illegal firearms, stolen goods, or
even such quantities of obscene materials as are inconsistent with
personal possession and use.1 211
Courts may ultimately hold Stanley to represent the proposi-
tion that one enjoys a constitutional right to do anything in one's
home that does not harm others. In other words, the state would
have no right to prohibit persons from sharing a home, absent
some showing of community harm.
A standard of community harm is, however, more easily stated
11 See Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21
STAN. L. REV. 767, 780-98 (1969).
Voiding the ordinance in Belle Terre need not have involved the Court in the zoning
thicket. That ordinance imposed a direct prohibition on unorthodox lifestyles. All zoning
laws are not so blunt. Minimum lot and minimum house size ordinances, for example, may
make it more difficult for persons of certain lifestyles to associate, but they do not consti-
tute outright prohibitions on unconventional associations.
118 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
119 One reading of Stanley might suggest that the petitioner was protected only because
he exercised a constitutional right, i.e., the first amendment "right to receive information
and ideas." Id. at 564. The Court's emphasis on the special nature of the home suggests,
however, that it was at least as much the setting as the nature of the activity that prompted
protection. This interpretation prevailed in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
65-66 (1973).
2
'See 394 U.S. at 568 n.ll.
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than applied. Assuming that a state or township wishes to regulate
population density-and surely such regulation would serve a
legitimate interest by reducing the imposition on the community of
more guests and friends, more noise and arguments, more com-
ings and goings, and more cars, motorcycles, household trash, and
the like-the state could do so by flatly prohibiting more than two,
or three, or whatever number of adults from sharing the same
dwelling unit. Thus, the state could satisfy its legitimate interest
in regulating population density-itself reflective of lifestyle val-
ues-without using means that so broadly discriminate against the
lifestyle choices of unrelated persons. 121
The real issue in Moreno and Belle Terre leads to other prob-
lems. Legal discrimination against households of unrelated persons
often has as its chief object the regulation of sexual activity outside
marriage.' 22 Yet a major failing of the "unrelated persons" provi-
sion in Moreno lay in the burden it placed on even the elderly poor
of the same sex who shared joint living arrangements. 123 Thus, the
lesson of Moreno may be that extramarital sexual activity cannot be
reached by such overbroad means as a blanket discrimination
against unrelated households. Direct prohibition of extramarital
sexual activity, however, is another subject.
II
PERSONAL SEXUAL CONDUCT
Sex in American society has traditionally been identified with
heterosexuality, with monogamous marriage and the nuclear fam-
ily. Outside these contexts, personal sexual conduct has been regu-
larly tabooed, through the use of law as well as of other social
sanctions. The emerging constitutional dilemmas in the area of
sexual conduct involve challenges to those taboos. The challenges,
taken together, raise the question whether intimate sexual relations
in forms not traditionally sanctioned are constitutionally protected.
Should certain values associated with sexual conduct-love, plea-
sure, intimacy, mutual interdependence-be given the protection
of the Constitution, or is that protection reserved for other
121 See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 19 (1974) (dissenting opinion,
Marshall, J.).
122 The Court in Moreno noted that a central purpose of the food stamp amendment
may have been to exclude "hippie communes" from participation in the program. It then
declared that purpose impermissible. 413 U.S. at 534.
122 In this respect, the ordinance in Belle Terre may have seemed less punitive to the
Court; it at least permitted two unrelated persons to share a home. See 416 U.S. at 8.
1977]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
values-childrearing, monogamous marriage, heterosexuality,
adulthood-with which intimate sex has customarily been linked?
The current lifestyle choices spawning controversy in the area
of sexual conduct, then, are choices to engage in unconventional
sexual relations. Such modern lifestyle choices result in what many
legislatures have termed "unnatural" sexual practices. Because of
the intimate nature of sexual conduct, "unnatural" sexual practices
have not been regularly analyzed or even legislatively par-
ticularized; hence an implicit legislative association has been made.
A form of intimate sex (homosexuality) has been thought "un-
natural" and therefore outlawed; practices (fellatio or cunnilingus)
identified with that form have similarly been prohibited, even in
their heterosexual variations. 124
Current sexual conduct cases typically involve violations of
sodomy statutes. The following dicussion seeks to show that recent
decisions on sodomitic conduct are not merely delineating the
scope of the constitutional right of privacy, but are confronting a
more basic issue. That issue is whether the state has an interest in
confining intimate sexual conduct to "acceptable" contexts, or
whether sexual conduct is to be constitutionally protected regard-
less of the unpopular, offensive, or "unnatural" form it may take.
A. The Doctrinal Framework: The Evolving Meanings of
Constitutional Privacy
The courts have regularly analyzed sodomy in terms of con-
stitutional privacy, a concept that in the course of its evolution has
embraced three distinct ideas. One is protection from intrusion,
summed up in the maxim that a man's home is his castle. This
concept of privacy derives from the fourth amendment, which for-
bids the state's invasion of one's home, office, automobile, person,
or effects absent the issuance of a warrant or, in carefully specified
situations, a law enforcement officer's determination of probable
cause.
A second concept of privacy might best be labeled seclusion. In
Griswold and in Stanley v. Georgia, the Court attempted to link pri-
vacy to intimate places, such as the marital bedroom or, more gen-
erally, the home. Stanley left open the question of the limits of this
124 A typical example is Virginia's statute, VA. CODE § 18.1-212 (Cum. Supp. 1974):
Crimes against nature.-If any person shall carnally know in any manner any
brute animal, or carnally know any male or female person by the anus or by or
with the mouth, or voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge, he or she shall be
guilty of a felony and shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than one year
nor more than three years.
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zone of privacy, and later decisions, notably Paris Adult Theater I v.
Slaton,'12 5 have confined the protected zone to the home. This has
resulted in some anomalies, such as a distinction between obscene
books read in the home (protected) and obscene books in transit
from one home to another or read on a wilderness vacation (ap-
parently unprotected).126 The boundaries of constitutional privacy
as seclusion are thus indeterminate, but it is clear that some pecu-
liarly intimate places associated with an individual's private life are
protected simply because the individual has a right "to be let
alone."12 7
Moreover, the concept of seclusion implies protected acts as
well as protected places. The concept suggests that one can, in
seclusion, engage in activities that would be offensive and even
illegal outside a protected, private zone. But the locus of the activ-
ity is not dispositive: protection for activity within the home is, as
previously noted, far from absolute. 12 Equally important in the
Griswold and Stanley results was the Court's conviction that the acts
in question-sexual intercourse and reading obscene litera-
ture-had a relatively low potential for working harm beyond the
secluded zone.
Meanwhile still another Griswold source of privacy-the marital
relationship-was undergoing refinement, and a third meaning of
constitutional privacy as personal autonomy began to emerge.
Griswold had tied privacy, or at least sexual privacy, to approved
relationships. Unmarried persons might not be able to assert pri-
vacy claims since they could not identify themselves with the "sa-
cred" institution of marriage. 29 Eisenstadt v. Baird'3" undercut any
such reasoning by requiring that access to contraceptives, however
defined, "be the same for the unmarried and married alike."
"[T]he marital couple," noted the Eisenstadt Court, "is not an inde-
pendent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association
of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup.' 3 ' Hence, Eisenstadt freed the right of privacy from the
marital context and seemed to liberate the right from any preoccu-
pation with place. Privacy, the Court hinted, might mean not only
freedom from intrusion or a right to seclusion, but freedom to
125 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
126 See id. at 66.
127 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (dissenting opinion, Brandeis,
J.).
'
2 See text accompanying notes 118-21 supra.
29 See 381 U.S. at 485-86.
130 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
131 Id. (emphasis added).
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make decisions about certain personal matters. "If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual . . . to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child."' 132
Roe v. Wade,133 the Court's principal abortion decision, ex-
panded the Eisenstadt meaning of privacy as autonomy to uphold a
limited constitutional right to decide to have an abortion. Again,
privacy was not confined to freedom from intrusion or to the
Stanley v. Georgia meaning of seclusion: abortions take place in
public hospitals, and participants are not subjected to searches and
seizures. What is private about a decision to have an abortion, the
Court argued in Roe, is the element of personal choice. The deci-
sion to have an abortion is intimate, because it reflects the special
concerns of one individual, not because it occurs in a private place.
Hence privacy in the Eisenstadt-Roe sense primarily means freedom
to make personal choices about one's intimate affairs. Yet the Roe
Court stopped short of completely equating privacy with auton-
omy. "[I]t is not clear to us," the Court stated, "that the claim...
that one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases
bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously articu-
lated in the Court's decisions.' ' 34
The evolving meanings of constitutional privacy reflect the
growing confidence of the Court in the privacy concept. Intrusion,
the earliest meaning, derived from rights explicitly protected by
the fourth amendment. Seclusion, a broader meaning, then in-
creasingly overshadowed intrusion as privacy rights became more
entrenched. Finally, protection for a right of autonomy developed
out of the Court's recognition that the right to privacy was a doc-
trine which had taken hold of the public's imagination: it did not
make its appearance until seven years after Griswold.
Clashes between the divergent meanings of privacy seem in-
evitable, especially in the area of sexual conduct. On some occa-
sions a personal choice to engage in intimate sex simultaneously
affirms the values of seclusion and autonomy, thereby creating a
privacy right of considerable strength; but at other times that
choice invades the seclusion and restricts the autonomy of others.
Forcible rape in public involves neither seclusion nor autonomy
values and is obviously not protected. Seclusion without autonomy
31Id. (emphasis in original).
.33 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
134 Id. at 154.
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is likewise insufficient. Rape in a private residence may be suffi-
ciently secluded, but of course forfeits protection in its invasion of
the victim's autonomy. Autonomy without seclusion may also be
unprotected: a consensual sexual act in public invades the seclusion
rights of onlookers. Only private, consensual sexual behavior taps
both strains of the Court's recent privacy cases and, in so doing,
creates a substantial lifestyle right against which various state in-
terests must be carefully weighed.
B. Judicial Confrontation of Taboos: Some Recent Sodomy Cases
Recent challenges to state sodomy statutes on privacy grounds
illustrate the need to unravel the various meanings of constitu-
tional privacy. Most such statutes flatly outlaw "unnatural" or "de-
viant" sex; they fail to create exemptions for classes of persons or
specific conditions. Fellatio, cunnilingus, and other forms of
sodomy are banned whether engaged in openly or in seclusion,
and whether engaged in by consenting married adults or by other
persons. In light of the evolving meanings of privacy, such statutes
seem vulnerable to constitutional challenge. They restrict personal
decisions about intimate matters, and their prohibitions reach into
areas, such as the home, associated with seclusion. In short, they
intrude into the very core of constitutional privacy.
Essential to a blanket prohibition of "unnatural" sexual con-
duct on moral grounds is a firm and generally shared belief that
the prohibited conduct is in fact immoral. When such a general
understanding exists, reasons justifying suppression of certain
conduct leap to mind. Murder is prohibited because it takes
another life, and to take another life without privilege is consi-
dered immoral. Arguably, a comparable understanding does not
exist to justify the prohibition of "unnatural" sexual conduct. In-
deed, one consequence of the more extended and open discussion
of sexuality characterizing American life in the 1960's and 1970's
has been a greater collective doubt as to which sexual practices are
"unnatural" and why. The reflex leap of faith that allows American
legislators to punish murder under their police power does not
exist for private consensual sexual conduct. Consequently, the
state interest in prohibiting "unnatural" sexual practices simply as a
regulation of public morality needs particularization. 135
A significant "unnatural" sexual practice case is Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney. 13 6 There a group of male homosexuals
135 See W. BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 103-08 (1973).
136 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
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sued in federal district court for declaratory and injunctive relief,
arguing that Virginia's sodomy statute'37 was unconstitutional as
applied to consensual homosexual acts performed in private by
adult males. The case was first heard by a three-judge panel that
voted two to one to sustain the statute, both on its face and as
applied to the petitioners.
The majority opinion asserted that state legislation regulating
personal sexual conduct is constitutionally suspect only when it
"trespasses upon the privacy of the incidents of marriage, upon the
sanctity of the home, or upon the nurture of family life.'1 38 To
support this assertion the majority announced that Griswold was
controlling, 139 yet it failed even to mention the possible extensions
of Griswold in Stanley v. Georgia, Eisenstadt, and Roe. The majority
then quoted at length1411 from dicta in a dissent by Justice Harlan
in Poe v. Ullman,' 4' where Harlan had argued that homosexuality
could be criminally prosecuted even if privately practiced, and
closed by recapitulating the long ancestry of sodomy legislation. In
short, the majority confined permissible sexual conduct to
contexts-marriage, home, family-where it had traditionally been
accepted, and demonstrated no awareness whatsoever of the evolv-
ing meanings of constitutional privacy.
An emerging constitutional quandary-whether after Stanley,
Eisenstadt, and Roe, a right existed to engage in private sexual prac-
tices outside the traditional marital context-was thus assumed
away by the Doe majority. Judge Merhige, however, argued in dis-
sent that Roe and Eisenstadt demonstrated that "intimate personal
decisions or private matters of substantial importance to the well-
being of the individuals involved are protected by the Due Process
Clause," and that "[tlhe right to select consenting adult sexual
partners must be considered within this category.' 42 Merhige
maintained that "fundamental rights of such an intimate facet of
an individual's life as sex, absent circumstances warranting intru-
sion by the state, are to be respected."'143 This was especially true
where the activity took place within "the private dwelling of a
citizen.' 44
'" See note 124 supra.
138 403 F. Supp. at 1200.
139 Id. at 1200-01.
14 0 Id. at 1201-02.
141 367 U.S. 497, 546, 552-53 (1961).
142 403 F. Supp. at 1204.
143 Id. at 1205.
144 Id.
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The Supreme Court, on direct appeal, summarily affirmed.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens voted in favor of noting
probable jurisdiction and setting the case for oral argument. In
some respects, however, the procedural posture of the case made it
an unattractive one for a full-blown decision. At most a threat of
prosecution had taken place; no circuit court had considered the
case; and the complexity of the issues involved had been aired only
preliminarily in Merhige's dissent. Given these circumstances, we
suggest that the decision of the Court to summarily affirm, al-
though an adjudication on the merits, should not be taken as an
indication that the Court is prepared to sustain sodomy statutes in
all situations. Rarely does the Supreme Court understand a prior
summary affirmance to preclude subsequent plenary consideration
of an important issue. Nor can significant issues of constitutional
law be definitively resolved in so peremptory a fashion.
Nonetheless, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney does establish the
proposition that state efforts to prohibit private, consensual
homosexual conduct are constitutionally permissible, despite
Stanley v. Georgia, Eisenstadt, and Roe. Pending more thorough Su-
preme Court review, lower courts are bound to that proposition.
Unfortunately, the Court announced its decision without any ac-
companying rationale. If a lifestyle right for consenting adults to
engage in intimate sex free from governmental interference is
taken seriously, a rationale for the Doe result will not be easy to
formulate. Consent assumes that neither partner has imposed his
sexual inclinations on the other; adulthood assumes that any spe-
cial interest the state might have in the sexual protection of minors
is absent; seclusion assumes that others are not exposed to the
practices. Thus, an autonomy right to freely engage in sex com-
bines with a seclusion right not to be disturbed in the private prac-
tice of intimate sex to produce a constitutional lifestyle claim of
some power.
Despite these considerations, state interests of significant
strength support a prohibition of homosexuality. First, a state may
be interested in discouraging public behavior that gives widespread
offense. This legitimate interest cannot be dismissed by simply an-
nouncing, as did Judge Merhige, that constitutionally permissible
homosexual conduct is limited to private settings. 145 Sexual liaisons
necessarily involve some public contact, especially at their incep-
tion. Heterosexuals meet in public places, share each other's com-
pany, flirt, and indulge in various displays of affection; homosex-
145 See id. at 1204-05.
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uals do as much. To equate sexual conduct wholly with private,
intimate acts is to compartmentalize sexual encounters in an un-
realistic fashion.
Thus, constitutional protection for secluded homosexual acts
might well produce a greater public exposure to homosexuality in
general. Criminalizing homosexual acts has certainly not succeeded
in suppressing all public display of homosexual affection; con-
versely, decriminalization would not eliminate the social disappro-
bation that causes many homosexuals to conceal their sexual pre-
ference. But it is safe to assume that removal of criminal sanctions
from private acts would lead to more open homosexuality, both
because homosexuality would no longer expose one to criminal
penalties, and because of the greater degree of tolerance that the
removal would imply.
Stanley v. Georgia and United States v. Reide1' 46 suggest one an-
swer to the state interest in avoiding increased public exposure.
Taken together, these cases hold that although possession of ob-
scenity in the home is protected, the preconditions to such posses-
sion, such as distribution of obscenity, are not. By analogy, the
state's interest in saving its citizens public offense could be pro-
tected by obliging the state to respect secluded activity, while per-
mitting arrest even for mild public displays of homosexual affec-
tion. Such a suggestion, however, is fraught with difficulty. Law
enforcement officials might well be unable to differentiate milder
forms of homosexual affection from normal expressions of friend-
ship and camaraderie. The Stanley "solution" would thus per-
petuate the sporadic and volatile street enforcement that exists
under present law.1 47
Moreover, it is debatable whether the state interest in protect-
ing the public from offense is alone sufficient to support the Doe
result. Surely the state may continue to prohibit the assault on
sensibilities that would be caused by public performance of the
most intimate homosexual acts, just as it now possesses that un-
questioned power with respect to heterosexual acts. And, it will
be argued by some that public sensibilities would adjust to the
milder sight of homosexuals holding hands or walking arm-in-arm
just as easily as those sensibilities have adjusted to the presence of
long hair, "suggestive" dancing, and other contemporary sights
that once were considered shocking.
The very fact of such adjustment, however, brings us to con-
146 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
'
47 See H. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 286-95 (1968).
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sideration of a final state concern. The most threatening aspect of
homosexuality is its potential to become a viable alternative to
heterosexual intimacy. This argument is premised upon the belief
that the practice of an alternative mode of sexual relations will
inimically affect the predominant mode. Thus, any recognition of a
constitutional right to practice homosexuality would undermine
the value of heterosexuality and the institutions and practices-
conventional marriage and childrearing-associated with it.
This state concern, in our view, should not be minimized. The
nuclear, heterosexual family is charged with several of society's
most essential functions. It has served as an important means of
educating the young; it has often provided economic support and
psychological comfort to family members; and it has operated as
the unit upon which basic governmental policies in such matters as
taxation, conscription, and inheritance have been based. Family life
has been a central unifying experience throughout American soci-
ety. Preserving the strength of this basic, organic unit is a central
and legitimate end of the police power. The state ought to be
concerned that if allegiance to traditional family arrangements de-
clines, society as a whole may well suffer.
Disapproving sexual conduct that might threaten traditional
family life is arguably a means related to this end. Criminal law
provides perhaps the strongest vehicle for expressing such disap-
proval. On the other hand, it is not the only vehicle for enforcing
conventional mores; community disapproval of errant behavior is
arguably a more potent enforcement mechanism than the law.
Moreover, the criminal law's effectiveness will be reduced if social
practices and attitudes run counter to its underlying assumptions.
Yet criminalization, whatever its lack of perfection as a deterrent, is
a dramatic symbol of social disapprobation. 148 Decriminalization
means, quite literally, the removal of disapproval, the recasting of
the state's posture as one of neutrality.
In seeking to regulate homosexuality, the state takes as a basic
premise that social and legal attitudes play an important and in-
terdependent role in the individual's formation of his or her sexual
destiny. A shift on the part of the law from opposition to neutrality
arguably makes homosexuality appear a more acceptable sexual
lifestyle, particularly to younger persons whose sexual preferences
are as yet unformed. Young people form their sexual identity
partly on the basis of models they see in society. 149 If homosexual
14 See id. at 42-43.
"9 See Acosta, Etiology and Treatment of Homosexuality: A Review, 4 ARCHIVES SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR 9, 16-18 (1975).
1977]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
behavior is legalized, and thus partly legitimized, an adolescent
may question whether he or she should "choose" heterosexuality.
At the time their sexual feelings begin to develop, many young
people have more interests in common with members of their own
sex; sexual attraction rather than genuine interest often first draws
adolescents to members of the opposite sex. If society accorded
more legitimacy to expressions of homosexual attraction, attach-
ment to the opposite sex might be postponed or diverted for some
time, perhaps until after the establishment of sexual patterns that
would hamper development of traditional heterosexual family rela-
tionships. For those persons who eventually choose the heterosex-
ual model, the existence of conflicting models might provide
further sexual tension destructive to the traditional marital unit.
Thus, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney ultimately presents a sig-
nificant lifestyle claim balanced against at least one important
countervailing state interest. The question raised by Doe is a dif-
ficult one: Should the state be constitutionally required to abandon
an ancient sanction, when abandonment might in time lead to
increasing, although statistically unpredictable, defections from
heterosexual behavior and traditional family life?151 On the an-
swer to this last question the authors have been unable to agree.
Mr. Wilkinson would uphold the state's interest in the preserva-
tion of the traditional family; Mr. White would desire stronger
empirical proof that the state interest is truly put in jeopardy by
homosexual practices among consenting adults. Both authors ac-
knowledge the intuitive elements in their judgments.
The balancing analysis we suggest for Doe-type cases is ap-
propriate in other instances where the concept of seclusion is in-
volved. Such a case was Lovisi v. Slayton, 15' a recent Fourth Circuit
decision. The question in Lovisi was whether a married couple
could be constitutionally prosecuted for consensual sodomy in the
presence of a third party.
Aldo and Margaret Lovisi, a married couple, were convicted of
sodomy under the same Virginia statute at issue in Doe. Prosecu-
tion of the Lovisis came when one of their daughters brought an
erotic photograph to elementary school and claimed that her home
was filled with similar pictures. A properly executed search re-
vealed many such photographs, including one depicting Margaret
Lovisi performing fellatio on her husband. A third party, one Earl
"",) See G. HuGHES, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE COURTS 23 (1975) for a view that the
defections would not prove substantial.
151 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976), affg 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973).
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Romeo Dunn, was present when the photographs were taken and
had engaged in sexual activity with the Lovisis. 152
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the Lovisis challenged the con-
stitutionality of Virginia's statute as applied to their sodomitic con-
duct with each other. The district court found that Griswold, Eisen-
stadt, and Roe secured protection of individual sexuality, but held
that the Lovisis had waived that protection by allowing their activity
to become public through careless exposure of the photographs. 153
The Fourth Circuit, splitting five to three, affirmed, but used a
different rationale. Although the court recognized a right of
privacy that embraced "marital intimacies," protection dissolved
when "a married couple admit[ted] strangers as onlookers" to
their sexual activities. 154 The test for protection was apparently
secrecy-in-fact: the presence of "observed 'peeping Toms'" or
"chance acquaintances" would be considered "accept[ed]," and con-
stitutional protection would thereby be lost.155 In addition, the
Fourth Circuit majority read Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney as
"necessarily confin[ing] the constitutionally protected right of pri-
vacy to heterosexual conduct, probably even that only within the
marital relationship.' 56
In two dissenting opinions, three judges in Lovisi found con-
stitutional immunity for consensual sodomy practiced by a married
couple, "whether practiced in secret or in the presence of a third
party or a camera."' 157 "Privacy," one of the dissenters maintained,
was a freedom "not limited to the conduct of persons in private." It
was better described as "personal autonomy" or "the right to be let
alone."158
Lovisi thus illustrates how sexual conduct cases reveal the mul-
tiple meanings-sometimes reinforcing and sometimes oppos-
ing-of the concept of constitutional privacy. An autonomous life-
style choice to engage in sodomy sometimes combines with a choice
to be left alone. A consensual sodomitic act by a married couple in
their bedroom presents a paradigm instance where the two
privacies reinforce one another. On other occasions, a choice to
practice sodomy is deliberately not secluded in the conventional
15' There was sharp controversy throughout the case over whether the pictures were
taken by the daughters or by a self-timing camera. See 363 F. Supp. at 622.
53 Id. at 627.
154 539 F.2d at 351.
155 Id.
... Id. at 352 addendum.
'
57 Id. (dissenting opinion, Winter, J.).
Id. at 356 (dissenting opinion, Craven, J.).
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sense. It involves more than two persons; it takes place outside the
home; it may even take place in the presence of strangers. In such
instances, the autonomy of the actors may conflict with the seclu-
sion rights of others. The two currently dominant meanings of
privacy collide.
In Doe, of course, the strength of the lifestyle right derived
from the convergence of the autonomy and seclusion aspects of
privacy. In Lovisi, the constitutional claim is not self-evident: the
autonomy dimension of privacy is present, but seclusion is more
doubtful. The leading cases are of limited help in determining the
meaning of seclusion. Both Griswold and Stanley v. Georgia involved
unquestioned instances of secluded activity. The Court depicted
Stanley as "sitting alone in his own house,"' 59 and the Court in
Griswold, in discussing the privacy of the marital bedroom, surely
did not contemplate the presence of a third party.
The scope of the seclusion aspect of sexual privacy remains
uncertain. It obviously does not extend to sexual activity on a
streetcorner, or sexual activity before an unwilling viewer dragged
into the marital bedroom. Nor do seclusion rights hinge solely on
the willingness of the observer; a couple clearly could not, after
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,'"° offer admittance to every member
of the public who wished to see them perform sexual intercourse.
The really difficult questions of seclusion come in cases of selective
viewings in intimate places. Should a Stanley-type petitioner, for
example, be able to claim seclusion rights for a dinner party at
which guests are invited to view obscene slides? Should protection
for sexual seclusion rights turn on the presence of two, and only
two, consenting persons?
Before Eisenstadt, courts might have seized upon the presence
of a third-party observer as evidence that the marital sexual inti-
macy of Griswold had been converted into something more akin to
sport, and thus have denied constitutional protection. After
Eisenstadt, however, it is uncertain whether the Court regards pro-
tected sexual intimacy as a function of marriage or as a function of
a prescribed number of persons.16 1 It is debatable whether the
Lovisis lost the seclusion half of their right to privacy the moment
third-party observers were admitted to their bedroom solely be-
cause such observers were likely to spread word of the Lovisis'
,59 394 U.S. at 565.
16,, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
161 Presumably large numbers of persons engaging in sexual activity within a home
could be regulated under a properly drawn breach of the peace and public nuisance
statute.
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sexual peccadilloes.'6 2 But we believe that the Lovisis did forfeit
their seclusion right when they took and carelessly stored photo-
graphs of their activity. Photographs are, of course, a way of pre-
serving and reliving pleasant experiences, of which marital sex is
surely one. Yet any couple that fails to take precautions against so
vivid and durable a record of their-intimate relations reaching the
hands of others risks losing the seclusion right important to any
lifestyle claim of sexual privacy. Thus, the district court more cor-
rectly pinpointed the rationale for the decision: "that snapshots
taken by the Lovisis were not kept at home in such a way that the
children would be denied access to them.' 163
Notwithstanding the difficulties of determining the limits of
seclusion, we believe it to be a necessary and indispensable part of a
lifestyle claim of sexual privacy. Not only may nonparticipants be
offended by the debasement of intimacy suggested by public sexual
acts, but they may also take offense at the acts themselves. And if
public offense is certain, seclusion becomes a necessary condition
for the legitimate practice of "unnatural" sex. Even if one takes
seriously the right of an individual freely to choose his sexual prac-
tices, that right must end where it infringes upon the right of
others to reject as offensive the mere observation of those prac-
tices. If the autonomous choices of some are not to invade the
autonomous choices of others, seclusion appears necessary. 164
Finally, it must be reemphasized that even though a constitu-
tional right to private sexual activity may exist, it still must be
weighed, as in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, against countervailing
state interests. Adultery is one type of sexual activity in which se-
clusion and autonomy rights may combine, but which the state may
still regulate to further its interest in the preservation of the tradi-
tional family. Clarification of the values at stake in the area of
sexual conduct can only come, we suggest, when taboos are ex-
amined with a view toward understanding the social assumptions
162 The Fourth Circuit believed that the Lovisis could "converse with friends or write
books about their sexual relations, recounting in explicit detail their own intimacies and
techniques, [and still] remain protected in their expectation of privacy within their own
bedroom." 539 F.2d at 351. This concession seems inconsistent with the Fourth Circuit's
conclusion that the presence of a third party onlooker alone destroyed the Lovisis' seclu-
sion rights.
1 363 F. Supp. at 627. The district court noted testimony by an investigative officer
that "'thousands' of photographs were to be found all over the house" and "were freely
available throughout the house to whomever lived there." In such circumstances the court
concluded that the Lovisis had "relinquished their right to privacy in the performance of
these acts." Id.
164 See Knowles & Poorkaj, Attitudes and Behavior on Viewing Sexual Activities in Public
Places, 58J. Soc. & Soc. RESEARCH 130 (1973-74).
1977]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
on which they rest, and when those assumptions are scrutinized in
practice, so that corrosiveness is distinguished from unconvention-
ality, and harms are differentiated from fears. The balancing pro-
cess we have proposed seeks, above all, a forthright discussion of
matters heretofore treated euphemistically.
III
PERSONAL APPEARANCE: HAIR STYLE AND DRESS
Kelley v. Johnson165 tested and upheld the validity of a police
department regulation limiting the length of policemen's hair. In
dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the "liberty" protected by the
fourteenth amendment encompassed "matters of personal ap-
pearance." 166 Such a reading, Marshall suggested, was consistent
with "the values of privacy, self-identity, autonomy, and personal
integrity that . . . the Constitution was designed to protect."'167
After Roe, Stanley v. Georgia, and Griswold, Marshall maintained, the
right of a citizen "to choose his own personal appearance" was
unquestionable; historically it had "simply been taken for
granted."'168
In contrast, Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority
seemed less certain about the existence of a right to choose one's
personal appearance. Rehnquist found the asserted appearance
liberty to be distinguishable from the liberties protected by the
Griswold-Stanley v. Illinois-Eisenstadt-Roe line of cases: those cases
involved choices "with respect to certain basic matters of procrea-
tion, marriage, and family life."' 169 Whether a choice of appearance
was comparable, Rehnquist maintained, was a question on which
previous cases offered "little, if any, guidance.' '7 1 Indeed, he
characterized appearance claims as involving "only the more gen-
eral contours of the [fourteenth amendment's] substantive liberty
interest,"'' and ultimately held, for the Court, that a member of a
uniformed civilian service had no fourteenth amendment right to
wear his hair as he chose.
Kelley highlights the threshold difficulties in subjecting per-
sonal appearance choices to constitutional analysis. The contours of
165 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
166 Id. at 250 (quoting majority opinion at 244).
167Id. at 251.168 Id.
16 9 Id. at 244.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 245.
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an "appearance right" remain uncertain; the context for protection
of that right, if it exists, has not been delineated; the entire area
lacks evaluative criteria. In the courts, impressionistic judgments
have predominated, ranging from Justice Black's belief that long-
hair cases were "purely local affairs,"'172 to Justice Marshall's associ-
ation of appearance "with the historically recognized right of 'every
individual to the possession and control of his own person,' ...
and .. .with 'the right to be let alone . . . . " 173 The following
discussion examines the sources of constitutional protection for the
appearance right and the diverse contexts in which claims have
recently surfaced. We end by proposing a framework for substan-
tive due process analysis of appearance issues.
A. The Doctrinal Background
One intriguing aspect of the history of the United States Con-
stitution has been the emergence of constitutional protection for
various liberties at times when, for complex cultural reasons, politi-
cal suppression of those liberties was considered desirable. For
many years after the repeal of the Alien and Sedition Acts, 174 free
speech issues were seldom raised in the courts; only in the early
twentieth century, when fears of radical European ideologies and
anxieties associated with World War I produced anti-subversive
legislation, did the first amendment begin to take on its modern
protective significance. 175 If one believes, with Justice Marshall,
that the assumption that "a man should have a right to wear his hat
if he pleased"'7 6 was so widely shared at the time the Constitution
was drafted that statement of an appearance right would have
belabored the obvious,17 7 an analogy to the history of free speech is
suggested. Pressures to define a freedom to choose one's personal
appearance have surfaced only when that freedom was threatened.
Such threats have occurred when certain appearances were
thought subversive. This perceived subversion has been a conse-
quence of the association of unconventional hair and dress styles
with political protest. If modern protection for free speech is a
child of World War I, potential protection for appearance choices
is largely the offspring of the Vietnam years.
172 Karr v. Schmidt, 401 U.S. 1201, 1203 (1971).
173 425 U.S. at 253 (citations omitted).
"I Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570; Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577;
Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
""See generally Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941).
176 425 U.S. at 252 (quoting I. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 54 (1965), in turn quoting
Rep. Sedgwick, August 13, 1787) (emphasis deleted).
177Id. at 251-52.
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Two Warren Court doctrinal innovations are among the
sources of constitutional protection for appearance choices. First is
the Warren Court's retreat, late in its history, from the dichotomy
between first amendment "speech" and "conduct." In cases such as
Cohen v. California'7 8 and Tinker v. Des Moines School District,'79 the
Court protected expressions-the wearing of a sweatshirt and the
wearing of an arm band-which were meant to communicate polit-
ical ideas, but which were not "pure" speech. Although the Court's
rationale in Cohen and Tinker stressed the content of the messages
conveyed, the cases could be read to extend first amendment pro-
tection to symbolic speech as manifested in dress.
Second, in Griswold the Warren Court developed a "penumbral
rights" theory that allowed the Court to derive constitutional rights
from emanations from textually designated rights. Griswold fur-
thered the potential emergence of an appearance right in two re-
spects. Substantively, the decision created protection for privacy,
which in the Burger Court has taken on a meaning of personal
autonomy, a value that arguably should encompass appearance
choices. And methodologically, Justice Douglas' Griswold opinion
appeared to free constitutional protection from the limitation of
explicit textual designation. If judges could protect marital sexual
privacy even though the Constitution did not single it out for pro-
tection, why could they not protect other privacies as well?
In its effort to secure certain privacy-derived protections, the
Burger Court created another, and perhaps more powerful, poten-
tial source of constitutional protection for appearance choices. One
textual means of protecting privacy lay in labeling the right a "lib-
erty" interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. The
Griswold Court had been unwilling to exercise that option: judicial
glosses on "liberty," it said, revived the discredited technique of
substantive due process.' 8 But by Roe v. Wade the Burger Court
was prepared to concede, for the purposes of candor or clarity,
that a limited right to have an abortion was a fourteenth amend-
ment "liberty." 18'
The revival of substantive due process in the privacy cases of
the seventies reminds us that although substantive readings of the
due process clause have gone in and out of fashion, a desire for
some judicial freedom from the restraints of constitutional
literalism has always existed. Substantive due process, ordered
178 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
179 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
180 381 U.S. at 481-82.
1I 410 U.S. at 153.
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liberty,1 82 fundamental fairness, 83 and other phrases associated
with judicial glosses on the Constitution have sought to respond to
a problem inherent in an enumerated Bill of Rights: How shall
rights too obvious to be enumerated receive constitutional protec-
tion if their obviousness evaporates? Personal appearance choices
pose a recent concrete example.' 8 4
B. A "Liberty" of Hair Style: Due Process Analysis
There is, of course, no designation of personal appearance as
a "liberty" encompassed in the due process clause. The Court in
Kelley assumed arguendo that such a liberty exists, but held that it
could be infringed. The Court's rationale was, as we shall argue,
flawed in giving such short shrift to the constitutional significance
of appearance choices. To introduce our argument it is helpful to
consider initially a more fully reasoned appearance case: the Fifth
Circuit's en banc decision in Karr v. Schmidt,'8 5 which held that a
Texas school board's regulation restricting the length of male stu-
dents' hair violated no constitutionally protected right.
Although student "long-hair" cases are now diminishing in
number, they remain an important benchmark in the debate over
lifestyle rights. The majority in Karr seemed concerned about two
aspects of such cases: the burden they placed on the federal courts
and the relatively trivial nature of the claims they raised. "[N]either
the Constitution nor the federal judiciary," the majority an-
nounced, "were conceived to be keepers of the national conscience
in every matter great and small.' 186 Concerned that different fed-
eral judges might interpret the reasonableness of hair-length regu-
lations differently, anxious to avoid court congestion, and unable
to conceive appearance claims as rising to the dignity of a great
constitutional right, the Fifth Circuit laid down a per se rule that
school board hair-length regulations were constitutionally valid. In
the process the court considered and rejected each of the potential
sources of constitutional protection for appearance choices.
Of the various sources reviewed by the Fifth Circuit, only sub-
stantive liberty under the due process clause received extended
treatment. The majority dismissed the relevance of the first
amendment to appearance cases by asserting that the wearing of
182 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
183 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 172 (1968) (dissenting opinion, Harlan, J.).
4See generally Grey, Do We Have 'An Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 703
(1975).
185 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972).
1161d. at 618.
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long hair did not have "sufficient communicative content" to in-
voke first amendment protection. 187 Karr, a student affected by the
regulation, had protested its enforcement because he "like[d] [his]
hair long."'188 Nor was a penumbral analysis persuasive. 18 9 Karr
antedated Eisenstadt and Roe, and the Fifth Circuit read Griswold as
being confined to intrusions into the home.' 9" Substantive due
process arguments, however, raised more substantial issues for the
court. But fourteenth amendment liberties, it felt, could be
"ranked in a spectrum of importance," at one end of which were
"the great liberties" of speech, religion, association, and marital
privacy, and at the other "lesser liberties."'19'
The right of a male student to choose his hair length was a
"lesser" liberty. It was such because, first, cropped hair eventually
grows back and thus "the interference with liberty [was] a tempo-
rary and relatively inconsequential one"; 92 second, school boards
enact numerous other regulations equally restricting the conduct
of students, from parking rules to lunch privileges; and third, the
federal courts ought not interfere with the management of local
school affairs except where truly "fundamental liberties" were
involved.' 93
The Fifth Circuit's triviality point is more easily stated than
explained. If the triviality argument reflects a subconscious judicial
downgrading of the rights of mere high school students, by far the
most frequent long-hair plaintiffs, 94 that downgrading is unsup-
portable. If, however, it is the choice that is trivial, as opposed to
those who exercise it, one wonders why school officials need bother
to regulate the matter at all. Finally, in any ordering of appearance
rights, a choice of hairstyle may rank among the most important,
for unlike uniforms and other prescribed modes of dress, hair
length follows a student from school into private life. Student hair-
length regulations, then, may illustrate the presumptuousness of
officials who interpret their power to regulate part of a person's
daily regimen as a mandate to regulate the whole.
Moreover, if labeling the hairstyle right trivial is a shorthand
way of declaring that the appearance right as a whole lacks impor-
187 Id. at 613.
188 1 Id. at 614.
189 Id. at 613.
19"Id. at 614.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 615 (foomote omitted).
193 Id. at 616.
"' See Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV.
670, 764 (1973).
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tance, the court's position is unacceptable. The values furthered by
protection of personal appearance choices are quite similar to the
values protected by the right of privacy-individual dignity, free-
dom of choice, and personal autonomy and integrity. Appearance,
like speech, is a chief medium of self-expression that involves im-
portant choices about how we wish to project ourselves and be
perceived by others. To link appearance with privacy and speech
values is not, of course, to require similar constitutional treatment.
It does imply, however, that we deal with a substantive constitu-
tional liberty that "may reflect, sustain, and nourish . . . per-
sonality,"' 95 and the repression of which may, in the words of
Judge Wisdom, "smac[k] of the exaltation of organization over
member, unit over component, and state over individual," forcing
an "unwilling complier ... to submerge his individuality in the
'undistracting' mass."' 196
Therefore, freedom to choose one's manner of appearance,
like the freedoms discussed earlier, is a lifestyle right of some sig-
nificance. And it is clear that at least one member of the Kelley
majority proceeded on that assumption. Justice Powell, in his con-
currence, found "no negative implication in the [majority] opinion
with respect to a liberty interest within the Fourteenth Amendment
as to matters of personal appearance."' 19 Yet acknowledging a
lifestyle right of appearance is no more than a first step in constitu-
tional analysis under the due process clause. The second is to ascer-
tain the context in which the choice has been made: What class of
persons seeks to exercise the right, and what reasons has govern-
ment advanced to regulate it? We focus, then, on the different
contexts of Karr and Kelley: Should a choice of hairstyle be pro-
tected for students but not for policemen?
In Karr the school board argued that regulation of hair-length
would serve the goals of inhibiting "classroom distraction," avoid-
ing fights between long- and short-haired students, and eliminat-
ing potential health and safety hazards.' 98 The Fifth Circuit called
these "legitimate objectives,"'199 clearly within the state's police
power. But proper due process analysis hardly stops with the ab-
stract finding of a legitimate state interest. Where regulation im-
pinges on a constitutional right-here, that of appearance-the
means chosen by the state ought significantly to further the an-
"' Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 250 (1976) (dissenting opinion, Marshall, J.).
196 Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 621 (5th Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
197 425 U.S. at 249.
198 460 F.2d at 617.
1 9 9
Id.
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nounced state objectives. 2 00
Forcing only male students to cut their hair is an impermissible
means of achieving the state interests at stake. Long hair on males
is intrinsically no less healthy and no more distracting and disrup-
tive of classroom work than long hair on females. Any difference is
the result of custom alone; men, and not women, are traditionally
short-haired. If conformity to custom is the unarticulated rationale
for hair-length regulations in schools, it seems insufficient to justify
the limitation on individual choice. The rationale suggests the un-
tenable: that mere unconventionality of appearance is enough to
bring the state's regulatory apparatus into play.
Finally, it must not be forgotten that the context of the student
hair-length cases is the public school system. Certainly, order and
discipline are values that public education in America seeks to fos-
ter, and conventionality and uniformity may be fairly thought pre-
requisites to the furtherance of those values. But American educa-
tion prizes other values as well: diversity, individuality, and
self-expression .2 11 If public education aims to teach children how
to adjust to a changing and pluralistic society, then schools ought to
foster independence as well as instill respect for authority. Thus,
schools are distinguishable from professions, such as the military,
where conformity to an authoritarian ethos may be the overriding
goal.
The student long-hair cases thus pit values fostered by protec-
tion of appearance choices against articulated state interests not
served by the chosen means of regulation and unarticulated pre-
mises about the function of education in America that seem half-
truths at best. There are, of course, stages of dress or undress that
would quickly activate the state interest in orderly classroom in-
struction, and degrees of personal uncleanliness that would raise
legitimate health concerns. But absent a showing of some definite
relationship between hair-length regulations and legitimate educa-
tional goals, the regulations should not be permitted to stand.
Assuming one adopts the above analysis for student cases,
should hair-length cases involving policemen and firemen, like
Kelley and Quinn v. Muscare,2112 be analogized to the student deci-
sions? The first step in the due process analysis is necessarily the
same: appearance choices are liberties against the government,
231 Although serious scrutiny of means has thus far been utilized by the Court primar-
ily in equal protection decisions, it seems equally necessary in cases which involve a sig-
nificant due process right. See Gunther, supra note 114, at 42.
"I1 See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
2012 425 U.S. 560 (1976).
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presumptively immune from regulation. But the second step re-
veals a different context for the appearance claim. Policemen and
firemen, unlike students, are professionals who, because of their
hazardous working conditions, must number group discipline and
order among their paramount goals. The ambiguities of freedom
versus order and self-assertion versus socialization that were iden-
tified with education are not found in professions that must neces-
sarily be more authoritarian.
Conventionality of dress and appearance can therefore be
more easily linked to the need for discipline, order, and efficiency.
Uniformity of appearance may convey to the public and instill in
the profession itself a more alert and rigorous approach to the job.
But although such factors may make the state's case stronger, they
do not end the constitutional inquiry. One may concede that some
restrictions on the appearance of policemen and firemen are justi-
fiable, without necessarily conceding that meticulous hair regula-
tions, on and off the job, are constitutionally valid.
For example, suppose a policeman accepted uniform stan-
dards for hair length, but demanded a short-haired wig while on
duty. Arguably, a wig would not sufficiently implement the pro-
fession's goals. Those goals go beyond mere functional conven-
ience; they involve the promotion of a sense of professional
homogeneity and togetherness, as symbolized by uniformity of ap-
pearance. The state might argue that wigs would convey the im-
pression that uniformity of appearance was no more than sham
and pretense, thereby undermining professional homogeneity and
morale.
The Kelley and Quinn results may rest on a further, unex-
pressed premise. The Court perhaps assumed that when an
adult chooses a profession, he accepts, within certain limits, restric-
tions on his behavior that flow from his professional status. Ap-
pearance restrictions, in varying degrees, are part of almost every
profession. Where without undue strain they can be tied to a
profession's basic functional imperatives, as in the case of police
and firemen, they become part of the costs and benefits one weighs
in choosing an occupation. It is possible, of course, that many per-
sons do not "choose" to become firemen or policemen, but rather
act from economic necessity, that they do not have perfect infor-
mation about restrictions on their lifestyle when they make that
choice, and that they therefore stand in roughly the same position
as students, who up to a certain age do not choose to attend school.
These arguments may have some validity in individual cases, but
we think that a consciousness of reasonable lifestyle restriction in-
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heres in most occupational choices.
Kelley and Quinn are thus defensible results: the hairstyle
choices of policemen and firemen raise different issues from those
of students. Yet the Kelley opinion provided only the most cryp-
tic rationale for evaluating lifestyle choices of appearance. The
majority found the policeman's occupational status "highly sig-
nificant, ' 2 3 and referred to Suffolk County's "recognition" that
"similarity in appearance of police officers is desirable. ' ' 21 4 From
these offhand statements the majority moved swiftly to conclude:
"Certainly . . . the claim of a member of a uniformed civilian
service based on the 'liberty' interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment [need not] necessarily be treated for constitutional
purposes the same as a similar claim by a member of the general
public. '2 "' And thus, Suffolk County's long-hair regulation for
policemen "did not violate any right guaranteed . . . by the Four-
teenth Amendment. ''206
We wish the Kelley majority had developed its reasoning, espe-
cially since lower courts, notwithstanding Justice Powell's caveat,
may treat the case as foreclosing constitutional protection for ap-
pearance claims. The Court in Kelley ultimately applied a "no-
scrutiny" rational basis test to the police hair-length regulations, 2 07
partly on the ground that they involved the exercise of authority
"unquestionably at the core of the State's police power. '2 08 But why
and to what extent this supine rational basis standard will be used
to test other burdens upon appearance choices 209 are questions the
Court must soon clarify.
C. The Appearance Overtones of "Unfettered Discretion" Cases
Although the Court has only reluctantly involved itself in
hair-length cases, it has extended constitutional protection to per-
sons whose dress and demeanor may trigger discretionary charac-
213 425 U.S. at 245.
2 04 Id. at 248.
21. Id. at 248-49.
2 116 Id. at 249.
20' The Court cited earlier opinions applying a rational basis standard to state eco-
nomic regulation, especially Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) and
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 425 U.S. at 247-48.
2"8 425 U.S. at 247.
2" There is some fragmentary evidence that the Court will extend this standard. In
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527-28 (1973), the Court readily approved a state
voir dire procedure that precluded questions to prospective jurors about bias against
bearded defendants.
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ter judgments by state officials charged with arrest or detention
duties. The Court has thus far cast these "unfettered discretion 210
decisions primarily in terms of the vagueness and overbreadth doc-
trines, which fail to reflect the analytical heart of the cases. The
principal operational difficulty with vague or overbroad ordinances
is not the lack of notice to detained parties-few people read state
or municipal ordinances-but rather is the opportunity such ordi-
nances create for arbitrary judgments by the police. In particu-
lar, ordinances with terms such as "common night walker,"21'
"annoying, ' 212 or "suspicious ' 21 3 invite the police to make subjec-
tive associations of conduct, including appearance, with criminality.
Given the brevity of most police contacts with citizens who stand or
walk on city streets, a citizen's appearance may play a substantial
part in forming an officer's judgment about the citizen's "suspi-
ciousness" or "annoying" qualities. Speaking for the Court in
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,21 4 Justice Douglas suggested that
imprecise municipal ordinances may require "nonconformists ...
to comport themselves according to the lifestyle deemed appro-
priate by the ... police. 215
The appearance aspect of "unfettered discretion" cases under-
scores one of the basic rationales for protection of appearance
choices. Americans purport to believe that a healthy society toler-
ates a multiplicity of viewpoints and lifestyles. The values of diver-
sity and nonconformity have been identified as buttressing the first
amendment. Hence, unconventional appearance choices test our
commitment to the preservation of those values outside the area of
speech. In a case overturning on grounds of statutory vagueness
the conviction of a Massachusetts resident for "treat[ing] con-
temptuously" the American flag by wearing it sewn to the seat
of his trousers, 21 6 the Court observed that "casual treatment of the
flag in many contexts has become a widespread contemporary
phenomenon," and that "[filag wearing in a day of relaxed clothing
styles may be simply for adornment .... ,"217 The Court refused to
210 The phrase is from Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court in Papachristou v. City
of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168 (1972).
21
1 See id. at 156 n.1.
212 Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 611 (1971).
213 Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 544 (1971).
214 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
215 Id. at 170.
216 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 568 (1974).
21 7 Id. at 574.
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reflexively equate unorthodox dress with contemptuous treatment
of an important national symbol.
In sum, recent "unfettered discretion" cases suggest that ap-
pearance choices may no longer be restricted without precise ar-
ticulation of the reasons for so doing. Although the decisions rest
on the vagueness doctrine and mention appearance rights only in
passing, they demonstrate at least an embryonic concern for the
protection of appearance choices themselves. Significant testing of
the appearance dimension of these cases awaits challenge to a more
specific ordinance, not open to a vagueness attack. Such a chal-
lenge would present a situation analogous to the hair-length cases,
and should, in our view, invoke the substantive due process
analysis advanced therein.
D. The Current Stature of Appearance "Liberties"
Constitutional protection for appearance choices remains in an
undeveloped state. First, there are doctrinal difficulties. Appear-
ance choices are more conduct than pure speech and communi-
cate with insufficient precision and consistency to invoke fruitful
first amendment analysis. Substantive due process, in our view the
most satisfactory doctrinal setting for appearance cases, has not
been in fashion for much of the twentieth century and places spe-
cial pressures on a judiciary that aspires to impartiality and neu-
trality. Thus, a credible, textual rationale for protection-a crucial
element in effective constitutional adjudication-is not readily
available.
Second, appearance choices have been burdened with the im-
plicit judgment, made by judges from Justice Black 18 to the major-
ity in Karr, that their stature as liberties is simply not very high;
that if they are rights, they are de minimis. Our discussion has
emphasized that this offhand treatment needs revision, despite the
generally accepted feeling that personal modes of dress and styles
of hair are of less than cosmic importance. Like the other lifestyle
choices analyzed in this Article, appearance choices reflect a di-
mension of our individuality. If respect for the uniqueness of each
person is a core value of American civilization, some degree of
constitutional protection for personal appearance choices should
follow.
2 18 See Karr v. Schmidt, 401 U.S. 1201 (1971).
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IV
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR PERSONAL
LIFESTYLES: AN OVERVIEW
A. The Case for Creation of a Constitutional Lifestyle Right
A basic question throughout this Article is why the Constitu-
tion should protect lifestyle choices at all. In Griswold and Roe the
Court sensed that lifestyle values deserved constitutional protec-
tion but failed to articulate persuasively an analytical basis for con-
ferring it. Providing the necessary articulation, however, is no
easy task; lifestyle choices, as such, receive no explicit protection in
the Constitution. As a result the Court has invoked the vaguest
and most nebulous of constitutional doctrines and provisions-
substantive due process, 2 19 the Bill of Rights' penumbras, 221 and
the ninth amendment 22 '-to safeguard them.
Although lifestyle freedoms are not expressly safeguarded, we
believe that the spirit of the Constitution operates to protect them.
We are aware of the historic dangers that attend judicial departure
from specific constitutional mandates. Judging by inference from
constitutional provisions, or from the Constitution as a whole, has
plunged the Court into difficulties in the past.222 Notwithstanding
textual and institutional difficulties, judicial recognition of lifestyle
freedoms as due process liberties better serves the basic purposes
of the Constitution than dismissal of them.
A compelling mission of the Constitution has been to protect
sanctuaries of individual behavior from the hand of the state. The
choice of religion and the advocacy of ideas have been deemed
matters outside the state's concern; 22 3 the privacy of the home224
and the inner sanctity of the mind 225 have been guarded against
governmental intrusion; the individual is protected from cruel and
i9 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973).
220 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (Douglas, J.).
221 Id. at 488 (concurring opinion, Goldberg, J.). The three-judge district court in Roe
v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970), also rested its decision upon a ninth
amendment rationale. See id. at 1219.
22E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For an interesting attempt to vindi-
cate rights of "personhood" without reviving the drawbacks of the Lochner approach, see
Craven, Personhood: The Right to be Let Alone, 1976 DuKE L.J. 699.
223 "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
224 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
225 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
1977]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
unusual punishment,2 26 and indeed from any criminal punishment
at all unless guarantees such as the right to counsel,22 1 to jury
trial, 228 and to confrontation 229 are observed. In this context, the
Bill of Rights teaches that human dignity is meaningless without a
proper measure of personal freedom from governmental interfer-
ence.
That dignity is seriously diminished unless it includes those
choices that most express our uniqueness and individuality. By our
style of dress and appearance, our personal associations, our man-
ner of speech, and our sexual behavior we seek to express our
uniqueness as humans and to realize our destinies as individual
beings. This does not mean that these expressions must be free
from all governmental regulation, any more than is our freedom of
speech under the first amendment. It does mean that as a starting
point of analysis, courts should acknowledge their constitutionally
protected status. For nothing is more central to self realization and
fulfillment than these very personal decisions. If the concept of
individuality is to have meaning, these choices must be protected.
There is another important reason for constitutional shelter of
lifestyle choices. The Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, has increasingly served to protect powerless minor-
ities-casualties of a majoritarian political process. There are, to be
sure, distinct and important limits to the Court's role as pro-
tector of the powerless. But from the initial Carolene Products23 "°
formulation of "discrete and insular minorities, ' 23 ' to the Warren
and Burger Courts' protection of blacks, 23 2 indigents, 233 ille-
gitimates, 2 4 resident aliens,2 3 5 criminal suspects, 23 6 and disenfran-
franchised 237 and underenfranchised voters,2 38 solicitude for the
disadvantaged has been a central theme in Supreme Court juris-
prudence. Similarly, the subjects of lifestyle protection are likely to
be persons unable to gain redress through the political process. A
228 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
227 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
228 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
229 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
220 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-54 (1938).
231 Id. at 152 n.4.
232 E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
233 E.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
234 E.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
235 E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
236 E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
237 E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
238 E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
[Vol. 62:563
PERSONAL LIFESTYLES
person of conventional tastes, having reputable friends, a courte-
ous vocabulary, and an unobtrusive appearance, is for those very
reasons not often considered offensive to the state in his lifestyle
choices. Obloquy is reserved for those whose tastes are unconven-
tional, whose tongues are thought sharp or vile, and whose dress or
behavior seems irregular or shocking. Yet it is just such persons
who give a constitution its mettle, and without whom human free-
dom would be limited to choices of which prevailing majorities
approve.
It would, in fact, be incongruous for an American Supreme
Court to be insensitive to diversity in lifestyle choices. From its
origins America has contained a variety of races and peoples, with
a multiplicity of thoughts and habits. Different ethnic and racial
origins have invariably bred different ways of living. Protection for
diverse lifestyles thus conforms to the character of a heterogeneous
nation. Moreover, conventional roles are increasingly being dis-
carded. Current lifestyles, for example, seem less the product of
one's sex or race or social background and more the result of
personal preference. The Court has been an important part of this
process. The higher standard of equal protection applied to sus-
pect classes has the stated purpose of freeing persons from the
bondage of racial and other stereotyping and of encouraging them
to seek their destinies as individual human beings.139 For the Court
to deny protection to unorthodox lifestyles would appear at odds
with much of its modern history.
The purposes served by protection of lifestyle choices are also
strikingly similar to those served by the first amendment. In per-
sonal behavior as well as in ideas, protection of individual choices
preserves dissent from the tastes of the majority. Like protection of
first amendment values, lifestyle protection attests to society's faith
that a free market in lifestyles, as well as in ideas, best aids the
individual in developing his own identity. And, as with the first
amendment, lifestyle protection may require defense of the most
idiosyncratic among us in order to discourage, at the outer perim-
eter, the state's natural inclination to compel its citizens to think
and behave in orthodox patterns.
Thus, there appear to us general considerations, touching the
very heart of the constitutional process, that argue for judicial rec-
... This was especially evident in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), where
four members of the Court argued in favor of making sex a suspect class. See also such
"middle-level" scrutiny cases as Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S. 7 (1975).
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ognition of a lifestyle right. It is imperative, however, that so
amorphous a concept as "lifestyle choice" be defined more pre-
cisely, a task to which we now turn.
B. The Limits of the Lifestyle Concept
The existence of persuasive reasons for the creation of a con-
stitutional lifestyle right suggests a further elusive question. Which
of our personal choices are to qualify for constitutional protection?
These choices are literally endless: we decide where to live, what
career to pursue, whether to seek a college degree, whether to
indulge in tobacco, alcohol, or drugs, whether to buy or ride a
motorcycle, or, to take even more common examples, whether to
jaywalk, go to the movies, or buy chocolate or vanilla ice cream. All
decisions at least potentially involve an assertion of personal free-
dom at the expense of the state's power to regulate. It is necessary,
therefore, to consider why our discussion of lifestyle freedom
should be limited to choices of domestic companionship, sexual
conduct, and personal appearance, in the face of so many other
individual decisions of comparable or greater magnitude.
We begin by noting that the individual lifestyle choices sur-
veyed in the preceding sections need-not constitute an exhaustive
list. For example, an additional lifestyle freedom, which the Court
appears to have recognized, is that of "personally flavored" speech.
Thus, we may express our ideas and may do so in whatever man-
ner and idiom we choose. In the leading decision, Cohen v.
California,2 4 the Court decided that to protect emotive vernacular
such as "Fuck the Draft" was to safeguard the verbal lifestyles of
America's countercultures. 241 "Indeed," the Court in classic life-
style terms observed, "we think it is largely because governmental
officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the
Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the
individual. '242 Under Cohen and its progeny, 243 freedom of idioma-
tic expression has prevailed over the state's interest in protecting
24" 403 U.S. 15 (197 1).
241 Note the view of Professor Haiman that Cohen involved a verbal lifestyle that rose
in popularity as "establishment figures revealed the fear and abhorrence produced in them
by such words." Haiman, How Much of Our Speech Is Free?, 2 Civ. LIB. REV. 111, 125
(1975).
242 403 U.S. at 25. This lifestyle freedom may be constitutionally unique in that it is
protected as a first amendment rather than as a due process or equal protection right.
243 Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S.
914 (1972); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518 (1972).
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the sensibilities of bystanders244 and over everything, in fact, save a
narrow public power to prevent the imminent outbreak of street
violence.245
To note that our discussion of lifestyle freedoms is not exhaus-
tive, however, is not to imply that such freedoms are numberless.
The lifestyle freedoms discussed in this Article combine several
prevalent characteristics. First, the choices themselves are intimate,
whether that intimacy derives from a place, such as the home, or
from personal use of one's body, as in the sexual conduct and
personal appearance cases. And, although it cannot be said with
assurance that even the most intimate choices of one person will
not somehow affect those about him, lifestyle choices for the most
part involve little prospect of direct or intentional harm to
others. 246 Where they do involve personal harm to other parties, as
to the children of a divorced couple or to parents upset about an
adult child's choice of a spouse, society would very likely conclude
that the lifestyle interests of the principals in being able to legally
separate or marry override the potential side-effects on those
nearby.
A further characteristic of lifestyle choices is their perceived
importance, indeed their indispensability, in fulfilling individuality.
Every personal choice is, of course, in part an expression and ful-
fillment of individuality, whether it be the choice of a home or car,
a career, a college education, or whatever. Yet these latter choices,
lying outside our lifestyle category, depend greatly upon economic
means or personal ability; in a competitive world of limited re-
sources, everyone will not obtain the career or home or college he
prefers. Conversely, there is a greater universality to lifestyle
choices. Marriage, child-raising, and intimate sexual expression are
arguably more inalienable rights of living; they exist or should exist
for all human beings, however circumstanced.
Thus it is ultimately irrelevant to our analysis that the right to
choose a career seems easily more important than the right to wear
long hair. Career choices simply lack, in our view, the degree of
personal intimacy necessary to characterize them as lifestyle
244 403 U.S. at 21-22.
245 Indeed, Cohen and its progeny may have narrowed "fighting words" (Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)) to direct facial insults to someone other than a
police officer. See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972) (concurring opinion,
Powell, J.).
246 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is an exception, if one takes the view that a fetus
is a person.
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choices. Expanding the concept of lifestyle freedom to include all
important marketplace decisions having some personal element
would eventually weaken the force of a lifestyle right and dilute the
protection our most intimate choices ought to receive.247
Finally, the term lifestyle choice means a choice in the truest
sense: the voluntary exercise of free will. Although courts ought to
be reluctant to infer that one's choice is not one's own, 24 8 it would
be anomalous and self-defeating to extend a theory of lifestyle
freedom to forbid state regulation of, for instance, the injection of
heroin, which for physiological reasons may not long remain a
matter of choice at all. On the other hand, that physical or
psychological gratification is the aim of a lifestyle choice is obvi-
ously no reason for failing to protect it.2 49
Drawing the line, however, is an exceedingly complicated and
treacherous task. In order to avoid the difficulties of assessing the
addictive qualities of different drugs and the compulsiveness of
various personal habits, we would recommend that regulation of
drugs and alcohol be left to the political process. Unlike marriage,
divorce, and personal appearance, for example, drugs and alcohol
have traditionally been associated with potential harm to others of
a magnitude justifying criminal sanctions. As a result, courts, and
certainly the Supreme Court, have largely stayed the hand of the
Constitution in this area. 25 1 We wish we could predict with cer-
tainty that such judicial self-restraint will continue.
In sum, we are considering a domain of personal choice whose
outer boundaries are not sharp, but which encompasses the most
intimate and the most personally distinctive of life's decisions.
We turn next to a review of the state interests that are most of-
ten advanced as justifications for restricting lifestyle freedoms.
Throughout this Article we have stressed that constitutional anal-
ysis of lifestyle claims is a balancing process, necessitating judi-
2417 This does not imply that career choices ought not to receive constittltional protec-
tion under some other method of analysis. See Wilkinson, supra note 116, at 984-98.
248 The question of voluntariness will pose difficulty in the area of lifestyle rights for
minors, especially for those who are very young. In voiding a blanket requirement of paren-
tal consent as a condition to abortion in the case of an unmarried minor during the first 12
weeks of pregnancy, the Court noted that "our holding . . . does not suggest that every
minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her
pregnancy." Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 2844 (1976).
219 It is difficult, in fact, to imagine a lifestyle choice not motivated, at least in part, by
such considerations.
25" Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), in holding that the status of narcotics
addiction may not be criminally punished, did not affect the state's power to regulate drug
possession or use. But see Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) (adult possession of
marijuana for personal home use protected under Alaska Constitution).
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cial evaluation of both the asserted substantive due process lifestyle
right and the various state interests supporting its restriction. We
now turn to a more detailed examination of those state interests.
C. An Assessment of Competing State Interests
Regulation of lifestyle freedoms falls within the classic formu-
lation of the state's police power, for "society ... has traditionally
concerned itself with the moral soundness of its people."' 251 The
lifestyle choices previously discussed each contain a significant
moral component. The efficacy of legal enforcement of moral be-
havior has been the subject of inevitable controversy, but the in-
terest of the state in the manners and morals of its citizens is well
established. What seems to us required in constitutional analysis is
a discerning look at the state interests advanced to restrict lifestyle
choices, so as to ascertain, first, whether those interests are legiti-
mate, and second, whether they are actually threatened by the
particular lifestyle choice in question. In discussing the state in-
terests in this area we avoid terms such as "rational" or "compel-
ling," both because those terms carry unwanted freight from their
use in other constitutional contexts and because the relationship of
legislated morality to personal choice involves sensitive judgments
having numerous subtle gradations. What follows is a brief and
generalized treatment of several state interests in roughly an as-
cending order of importance.
Least persuasive of the state's justifications for restricting life-
style freedoms is the general promotion of morality. Such an in-
terest requires a court to accept on faith, in the name of the police
power, the state's moral judgment. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court has reacted to this interest most ambivalently. Chief Justice
Warren once suggested in dissent that there is a "right of the
Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society. '252 The
Court in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton253 carried forward this theme
and spoke approvingly of the state's power to regulate "the tone of
society, . . .the style and quality of life, now and in the future. 254
It noted that "[f]rom the beginning of civilized societies, legisla-
tors and judges have acted on various unprovable assumptions, 255
and stated: "In deciding Roth [v. United States], this Court implic-
251 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545-46 (1961) (dissenting opinion, Harlan, J.).
252 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964).
253 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
254 Id. at 59 (Quoting Bickel, On Pornography: II, Dissenting and Concurring Opinions, 22
PUB. INTEREST 25, 25-26 (1971)).
255 413 U.S. at 61.
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itly accepted that a legislature could legitimately act on such a con-
clusion to protect 'the social interest in order and morality.' "256
Other recent Court opinions, however, indicate that such gen-
eral state assertions of moral righteousness will not suffice. The
Moreno Court strongly hinted that attempts to regulate lifestyle
choices on the bare assertion that the regulation serves morality
would be impermissible. 257 Indeed, it seems impossible that the
Court could have reached the results it did in Griswold, Stanley v.
Georgia, Eisenstadt, and Roe without proceeding on just that prem-
ise. Somewhat ironically,258 Chief Justice Burger's opinion in
Wisconsin v. Yoder 259 provides the most explicit evidence that con-
clusory invocations of morality on the part of public authority will
be found wanting: "There can be no assumption that today's ma-
jority is 'right' and the Amish and others like them are 'wrong.' A
way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights
or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is
different. ' 26 11
Absent refinement and particularization, state interests in pre-
serving morality lack the weight necessary to support restriction of
the free exercise of lifestyle choices. Certainly, it would seriously
abuse the legal process to condemn private and remote acts simply
because the acts strike the majority as repulsive.
The privilege of living in a free and open society entails, we
believe, some obligation to tolerate ideas and moral choices with
which one disagrees. To think one's own moral predilections
should invariably be embodied in law is unrealistic in a society
committed, as ours is, to the freedom and dignity of the individual.
Moreover, to uphold legal proscriptions on grounds of abstract
morality would permit the state to ferret out and ultimately to try
and punish offenders upon the assertion, not that the given be-
havior was socially harmful, but that it was revolting and un-
natural. Such a rule of law would invite the majority to act upon its
least noble and most prejudiced impulses.26' Courts have the initial
256 Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957), in turn quoting Chap-
linsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)) (emphasis in original).
257 Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 n.7 (1973).
258 It is ironic because Chief Justice Burger was also the author of the opinion for the
Court in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
259 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
2 60 Id. at 223-24.
261 The question of the state's capacity to regulate unorthodox lifestyle choice in the
name of morality is illuminated by the debate over Lord Devlin's position that society, for
its protection, may criminalize deviant behavior on the basis of a strong community feeling
of moral disapproval. P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965).
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obligation to ensure that invasions of lifestyle choices rest upon
firmer and more particularized grounds.
A second justification, aligned with the foregoing but deserv-
ing of more serious consideration, is that state regulation of life-
style choices protects the individual from self-inflicted harm or
self-degrading experiences. Here the state professes not to be reg-
ulating morality, but rather to be paternalistically saving the indi-
vidual from himself.262 Since society often wishes to save the indi-
vidual from conduct society abhors, however, the moralistic and
paternalistic rationales are frequently identical.
Paternalism underlies a great variety of state legislation, in-
cluding that regulating gambling, drugs, and alcohol, that prohibit-
ing suicide and "immoral" sex, and that requiring the payment of
social security taxes and even the wearing of motorcycle hel-
mets.263 Such legislation, however, often protects against public as
well as private harm. Drug legislation seeks to protect society
against the crimes of an addict supporting his habit; motorcycle
helmet laws allegedly prevent accidents and certainly minimize the
costs to society of supporting injured riders and their dependents.
In general, protection of the individual from readily demonstrable
physical harm, whether from addictive drugs or motorcycle acci-
dents, may be more supportable than protection of persons from
acts alleged by the state to be "unnatural" or "immoral." Saving
bodies, to be blunt, may be a more justifiable governmental pur-
pose than saving souls.
Difficult questions yet remain. Almost every lifestyle choice
involves some possibility of physical harm, especially with intem-
perate indulgence. A substance such as tobacco presents the hard
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to recapitulate the debate in its full
subtlety, the response of Lord Devlin's opponents pinpoints our own reservations about the
dangers of state regulation of lifestyle choice under so vague a guise as "morality." One
commentator chides Devlin for inviting "intolerance, indignation and disgust" as the pre-
requisites for legal action. Anastaplo, Law and Morality: On Lord Devlin, Plato's Meno, and
Jacob Klein, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 231, 238. Professor Dworkin criticizes Lord Devlin for per-
mitting legal judgments on morality to be based on nothing more than "prejudice... and
personal aversion." Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986,
1000-0 1 (1966). See also Hart, Immorality and Treason, 62 THE LISTENER 162 (London 1959);
Hughes, Morals and the Criminal Law, 71 YALE L.J. 662 (1962).
262 The seminal discussion of this interest is in J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY, Ch. IV, Of the
Limits to the Authority of Society Over the Individual (London 1859).
263 The helmet requirement has created considerable controversy. See, e.g., State v.
Cotton, 55 Haw. 138, 516 P.2d 709 (1973); People v. Fries, 42 Ill. 2d 446, 250 N.E.2d
149 (1969); American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Department of State Police, 11 Mich. App. 351,
158 N.W.2d 72 (1968). See generally Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day
of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 929-30 (1976).
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case: the danger to heart and lungs is cumulative and eventual, and
not as dramatic as heroin addiction or a motorcycle crash. Perhaps,
as one commentator suggests, society's paternalistic interest should
be limited to confronting
smokers with the ugly medical facts so that there is no escaping
the knowledge of what the medical risks to health exactly are.
Constant reminders of the hazards should be at every hand and
with no softening of the gory details. The state might even be
justified in using its taxing, regulatory, and persuasive powers to
make smoking ... more difficult or less attractive .... 264
But to proscribe smoking outright, and thus to substitute the medi-
cal judgment of the state for the personal lifestyle choice "is pater-
nalism of the strong kind .. .and creates serious risks of govern-
mental tyranny. 265
The notion that the state may inform, warn, tax, and regulate,
but not flatly proscribe allegedly self-destructive lifestyle choices,
provides a useful touchstone. But it still does not resolve many
difficulties. We would surely, even after Griswold, allow Connecticut
to advise and inform potential users of the medical risks and dan-
gers inherent in contraception. But to what extent might Connect-
icut publicly advertise the "immorality" of contraceptives, if a ma-
jority of its citizens regarded them as immoral? To what extent
could it tax contraceptives? Could a state or locality that considered
interracial marriages self-degrading and morally depraved post
notices to that effect in public buildings? At some point such
notices would raise a strong inference that the state intended to
discriminate against those who pursued the disfavored activity. In
short, professedly beneficent, paternalistic motives should not be
an automatic justification even for regulation that stops short of
proscription.
Curtailing activities that offend the public is a third rationale
for state regulation of lifestyle choices. Certainly a citizen can assert
some right not to be assailed in public by deeply revolting behavior.
On the other hand, the very act of stepping out in public inevitably
entails a risk that one's personal sensibilities will be offended. The
public is by definition a diverse, variegated collection of individu-
als, with a multitude of idiosyncratic habits. Some of these hab-
its-of dress, personal association, and mode of expression-
constitute the exercise of lifestyle choices. And striking the bal-
2 4 J. Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, in TODAY'S MORAL PROBLEMS 33, 43 (1975).
2 6 5 Id.
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ance between public and personal rights in this area is often dif-
ficult.
Certain guidelines are helpful, however, in evaluating this
third state interest. In assessing the degree to which certain be-
havior offends the public, courts ought to employ an objective
rather than a subjective standard and ask whether the behavior in
question would offend a reasonable person, not whether it dis-
tresses the most sensitive member of .the community. Any lesser
standard fails to give proper effect to the constitutional stature of
lifestyle choices. Courts should also consider whether the of-
fending behavior is a localized incident from which one can avert
the eyes or walk away, whether it is temporary or permanent,
whether it is unobtrusive or insistent in character, and whether
either the state interest or the lifestyle choice could be exercised in
a less intrusive manner.
A simple illustration may help. Compare, for example, the
appellant in Cohen v. California,266 who wore a "Fuck the Draft"
message on his jacket in the Los Angeles Co unty Courthouse, with
a couple engaging in sexual intercourse in a visible area of a public
park. In both situations a passerby could retreat from the incident
by averting his gaze or step. And both Cohen's act and the couple's
activity are presumably one-time incidents of limited duration. But
the similarity ends there. A reasonable person would be substan-
tially more offended by the sight of sexual intercourse in public
than by a message reading "Fuck the Draft," a sentiment regular-
ly encountered on the walls of public restrooms. Furthermore,
Cohen's message might be less effective if conveyed in a less
dramatic or personalized manner, and totally ineffective if con-
fined to the privacy of his quarters. And although the shock value
of whatever the copulating couple might be attempting to com-
municate would also be eliminated by privacy, the feelings of inti-
macy and pleasure associated with sexual intercourse would not.
Thus the state interest in avoiding public offense more readily
suffices to limit the lifestyle, freedom of the couple than of
Cohen.2 67
A fourth state interest in restricting lifestyle choices is the pre-
vention of physical violence and disorder. Public display of unor-
thodox habit often meets with onlooker disapproval. Thus, author-
ities will inevitably be heard to argue that shocking manners of
266 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
267 For a demurrer to Cohen, see Rehnquist, Civilit and Freedom of Speech, 49 IND. L.J.
1 (1973).
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dress and speech, for example, pose serious threats to the mainte-
nance of public peace.
Preservation of order is certainly a legitimate state concern.
But the mere recitation of this interest would not justify state re-
striction of the lifestyle right. In analyzing tensions between life-
style choices and the preservation of order, the "street speech"
cases of the 1950's and 1960's seem particularly apt. Like verbal
dissent, unorthodox lifestyle choices may "strike at prejudices and
preconceptions" and "invite dispute. '268 Yet official condemna-
tion of such choices should be based upon more than an "undiffer-
entiated fear or apprehension of disturbance. ' 269 Authorities, in
fact, may rightly be charged with some duty of protecting rather
than restraining their exercise,2 " especially where such exercise
is "peaceful" in character.27 1
An important variation on this fourth state interest lies in state
protestations that restriction of the lifestyle right prevents public
harm of a nonviolent nature. Examples would be a school's asser-
tion that long hair poses not so much a risk of disruption, as a
problem of hygiene, or the claim of the Village of Belle Terre that
cohabitation by more than two unrelated persons threatens not a
riot, but the community's general repose. In such situations, involv-
ing important constitutional claims and legitimate state concerns,
scrutiny of means becomes especially important. The means em-
ployed by government ought to significantly advance the asserted
legitimate state interest, not some punitive alternative one. Thus, in
Belle Terre the limitation only upon unrelated persons living together
may not fully implement the village's asserted interest in tranquil-
ity, and in the long-hair cases, the means often sweep too broadly
by eliminating all unusual hairstyles without regard to cleanliness.
Such dramatically under- and over-inclusive selection of means, in
relation to the asserted state purposes, creates suspicion that the
true aim of the state is more the elimination of variant lifestyle
behavior than the promotion of its legitimate goals.
A fifth and final state interest is that removal of legal con-
straints on lifestyle freedoms may jeopardize the most hallowed
and basic institutions of society. Thus state regulation of matters
268 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
269 Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). The state may, of
course, act to prevent the outbreak of violence. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315
(1951).
"" See id. at 326 (dissenting opinion, Black, J.).
271 See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963).
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such as divorce and sexual conduct becomes a means of fortifying
institutions, such as marriage and the family, that impart meaning
and elevation to human life.
The state interest in preserving the family unit needs to be
carefully understood. Arguably, the state has no legitimate interest
in restricting living arrangements to a narrow ideal of domestica-
tion: to, for example, the middle-class family of four safely cot-
taged in the suburbs. That model has been with us too briefly 272
and is changing too quickly273 to be the real basis of the state's
interest in this area. Rather, the state's proper concern derives
from the basic functions performed by "family" units in society:
from sexual fulfillment and reproduction, to education and rear-
ing of the young, to economic support and emotional security.2 7 4 It
is true, of course, that sexual and reproductive acts take place
outside the family unit, and that education of the young and
economic support often come from the state.2 7 5 Still, the vital pur-
poses of the family-child rearing and emotional fulfillment of its
members-appear to require some fidelity and constancy of rela-
tionship. Margaret Mead recently put it best:
There needs to be a place where children will know that they
belong, where they have an unquestioned right to be, where
there will always be responsible adults to welcome them and care
for them. For teenagers there needs to be a place from which
they can run away without going too far, and come home again,
as they try out what it is like to be on their own. For adult men
and women, there needs to be a place where someone will always
know and care if they fail to return when they said they would,
however far they have traveled. 27 6
272 The common view is that urbanization and industrialization have encouraged shifts
in American family structure from an extended kinship pattern to the present nuclear
unit. Sociologists disagree on the degree to which American family life resembles the iso-
lated nuclear or the extended kinship model. See Winch, Some Observations On Extended
Familism in the United States, in SELECTED STUDIES IN MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 127 (R.
Winch & L. Goodman eds. 1968).273 See notes 8-12 and accompanying textsupra.
27 4 See Murdock, The Universality of the Nuclear Family, in A MODERN INTRODUCTION To
THE FAMILY 37, 43 (N. Bell & E. Vogel eds., rev. ed. 1968).
275 For the view that the family has now lost many of its central and traditional func-
tions, see Ogburn, The Changing Functions of the Family, in SELECTED STUDIES IN MARRIAGE
ANP THE FAMILY, supra note 272, at 58.
...The Once and Future Home, Washington Post, July 4, 1976, B1, B5. Dr. Mead con-
tinues:
Over and over again, throughout history, there have been attempts to destroy this
family unit and to invoke mythological past happenings to justify contemporary
social experiments, such as the assertion that in earlier times there was no family
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This necessary stability of home and family life is often fos-
tered by legal recognition of marriage, legal regulation of marital
dissolution, and legal condemnation of promiscuous sexual be-
havior. Law adds to such stability both by defining acceptable stan-
dards of behavior and by discouraging deviation from them.
Where vindication of lifestyle diversity can be shown to damage so
basic an institution as the family, courts should not order it.
The difficulty comes in the showing. The withdrawal of law
from certain areas of moral choice does not inevitably portend a
collapse of the social order. In this regard, a historical analogy may
be appropriate. Perhaps no moral and social force has been as pow-
erful and pervasive in America as organized religion. Yet the
framers of the Constitution deliberately removed religious choice
and allegiance from the domain of law and placed them within the
realm of personal decision. Nonetheless, organized religion and
religiousity have survived the first amendment and have remained
important ingredients in American life over the generations. And
atheism and agnosticism, despite being protected by the Constitu-
tion, have never really taken root.
Understanding why organized religion and religiosity have
remained important forces in American life provides an instructive
lesson. They have flourished, in large part, because there exist,
independent of law, powerful ways for society to check unorthodox
and dissident behavior. Even if the law may not be used to enforce
conventional lifestyle choices, the private forces of society will re-
tain other means of maintaining conformity: for example, social
exclusion from private gatherings and organizations, denial of em-
ployment and career advancement, and use of derogatory epithets,
all of which largely lie beyond the reach of the Constitution. A
reality of American life is that community acceptance, respect, and
influence are bestowed upon those whose behavior is generally
conventional.
Our plea, finally, is for a balanced and sensitive approach to
the central dilemma examined in this Article. Every great society,
as a predicate of existence, has rallied the allegiance of its members
to some common responsibilities and patterns of living, an al-
legiance backed to a significant extent by the power and majesty of
the law. Definite accommodation must be reached with the rights
and human beings practised "group marriage," for example. So far in human
history, however, societies have not found a way to rear children without the ties
of parents to children and children to parents.
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of dissident members, but not so complete an accommodation as to
leave the conventional social fabric without legal support. We must
be wary of creating, in the high name of constitutional right,
nothing more than a regime of self gratification and indulgence.
Equally distressing, however, would be an orthodoxy so pervasive
that personal creativity, expression, and realization would be stifled
and denied. The Constitution must remain a charter of tolerance
without becoming an instrument of social dissolution. There will be
no more difficult task.

